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THE RESUMED FIFTH BTWC REVIEW CONFERENCE:   
MAXIMIZING THE BENEFITS FROM THE FINAL DECLARATION 
 
by Graham S. Pearson* & Nicholas A. Sims† 
 
Introduction 
 
1.   The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
opened in Geneva on 19 November 2001 and agreed on Friday 7 December to adjourn until 
11 November 2002.  The Interim Report1 records that: 
 
33.  At its sixth plenary meeting on 7 December 2001, the Conference decided by 
consensus to adjourn its proceedings and reconvene at Geneva from 11 to 22 
November 2002. 
 
Ambassador Tibor Tóth, President of the Review Conference, had said at his Press 
Conference2 on the morning of 7 December 2001 that 75% of the Final Declaration had been 
consolidated and at a later Press Conference3 the same day he had said that, when the 
decision to adjourn was taken, the draft Final Declaration was 95% ready.   The Fifth Review 
Conference had thus been close to agreement of its Final Declaration when it agreed to 
adjourn until 11 December 2002. 
 
2.  As the Final Declarations at successive Review Conferences have provided a valuable 
strengthening of the BTWC regime through the extended understandings agreed in these 
Final Declarations4, it is timely to revisit the draft Final Declaration5 circulated by the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee on the morning of Friday 7 December 2001 -- the 75% 
consolidated version -- and to examine what language is needed to complete the Final 
Declaration and achieve a valuable outcome that continues the strengthening of the regime 
through further extended understandings. 
 
3.  Although there is an argument that no changes should be proposed to those sections of the 
draft Final Declaration where there is no disagreement, this would be a failure by the States 
                                                 
* Graham S. Pearson is a Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies at the 
University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7  1DP, UK. 
† Nicholas A. Sims is a Reader in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London  WC2A  
2AE, UK. 
1United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Interim Report, BWC/CONF.V/12, 14 December 2001.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
2United Nations, Highlights of Press Conference held on Ongoing Developments of the Fifth Review 
Conference of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention on 7 December at the Palais des Nations, 7 
December 2001.  Available at http://www.unog.ch/news/documents/newsen/pc011207.html 
3United Nations, Comments made by the President of the Fifth Review Conference of States parties to the 
Biological Weapons Convention after the Adjournment of the Review Conference until November 2002, 7 
December 2001.  Available at http://www.unog.ch/news/documents/newsen/pc011207b.html 
4Nicholas A. Sims, The Functions of the BTWC Review Conferences:  Maximizing the Benefits from the Fifth 
Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 2, 
April 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
5Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Draft Final Declaration, morning 7 December 2001.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/revconf/draft_FD.pdf 
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Parties to extract the maximum benefit from the Final Declaration particularly in those 
sections where the language in the draft has not been but should be developed from that 
adopted in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in 1996.  Such a failure 
would be particularly unfortunate given that the Fifth Review Conference has taken place at a 
time when concern about biological weapons whether in the hands of States or of terrorists is 
at an all-time high around the world.   
 
4.  The Bradford briefing book6 "Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference" distributed to 
States in November 2001 considered each Article in turn, first set out the language in the 
relevant section of the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, then the 
developments since the Fourth Review Conference relating to the Article and concluded by 
recommending language for the appropriate section of the Final Declaration of the Fifth 
Review Conference.   The approach taken in this Review Conference Paper is to consider on 
an Article by Article basis the language in the draft Final Declaration7 of the morning of 
Friday 7 December 2001 against the background of the "Key Points for the Fifth Review 
Conference" and to consider where language could and should be developed so as to 
maximize the benefits to the BTWC regime from the extended understandings included in the 
Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference.  Consequently, on an Article by Article 
basis we have recommended appropriate language for the Final Declaration.  In addition, we 
have included corrections to typographical errors found in the draft Final Declaration and we 
recommend that the draft Final Declaration be reviewed throughout to correct all such 
typographical errors.  Finally, a Check List has been added at the end of this Review 
Conference Paper which lists all the recommended changes to the draft Final Declaration. 
 
Solemn Declaration 
 
5.  The language in the Solemn Declaration section of the draft Final Declaration stated that: 
 
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL 
(BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, WHICH 
MET IN GENEVA FROM 19 NOVEMBER TO 7 DECEMBER 2001 TO REVIEW 
THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION, SOLEMNLY DECLARE: 
 
- The determination of the States Parties to accomplish the total 
elimination of all weapons of mass destruction; 
 
- The determination of the States Parties also to achieve general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, which 
is the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process; 
 
- Their reaffirmation that the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction is essential for international and 
regional peace and security; 
                                                 
6Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons 
Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 
November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
7Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Draft Final Declaration, morning 7 December 2001.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/revconf/draft_FD.pdf 
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- Their reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the 
Preamble and the provisions of the Convention; 
 
- Their dissatisfaction at the fact that, after a quarter of a century since 
the entry into force of the Convention, universality has not yet been achieved; 
 
- Their reiteration that the effective contribution of the Convention to 
international peace and security would be enhanced through universal 
adherence to the Convention, and their call on signatories to ratify, and other 
non-States parties to accede to, the Convention at the earliest; 
 
- Their reaffirmation that under any circumstances the use, 
development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and 
toxin weapons is effectively prohibited under Article I of the Convention; 
 
- Their continued determination, for the sake of humankind, to exclude 
completely the possibility of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and 
toxins as weapons, and their conviction that such use would be repugnant to 
the conscience of humankind; 
 
- Their renewed determination to ensure, through the full 
implementation of Article I prohibitions that biological and toxin weapons are 
never acquired, developed, produced, stockpiled or used; 
 
- Their conviction that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and 
whatever its motivation, is abhorrent and unacceptable to the international 
community and that terrorists must be prevented from acquiring agents, 
toxins, biological weapons or associated knowledge; 
 
- Their conviction that the full implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention should facilitate economic and technological development and 
international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities; 
 
- Their recognition of the particular importance of responding to the 
threat posed by biological weapons by strengthening the Convention including 
through binding measures agreed by all States Parties. 
 
The States Parties recognize that the important principles contained in this Solemn 
Declaration can also serve as a basis for further strengthening of the Convention. 
 
6.  Unlike at the Fourth Review Conference where the Solemn Declaration was developed 
from that at the Third Review Conference with the addition of two additional points8, the 
draft Final Declaration for the Fifth Review Conference uses new language.  The new 
language had been agreed with 12 subparagraphs and contains several new subclauses from 
the nine subparagraphs of the Fourth Review Conference including the following: 
 
                                                 
8See page 140, paragraph 3 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening 
the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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- The determination of States Parties to accomplish total elimination of all weapons 
of mass destruction; 
 
- Their dissatisfaction at the fact that, after a quarter of a century since the entry into 
force of the Convention, universality has not yet been achieved; 
 
- Their conviction that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and whatever its 
motivation, is abhorrent and unacceptable to the international community and that 
terrorists must be prevented from acquiring agents, toxins, biological weapons or 
associated knowledge; 
 
-  Their recognition of the particular importance of responding to the threat posed by 
biological weapons by strengthening the Convention including through binding 
measures agreed by all States Parties. 
 
The addition of the subparagraph relating to terrorism, a suggestion made in the Key Points9, 
is welcomed.  
 
7.  Two subparagraphs are omitted from those that had appeared in the Solemn Declaration 
for  the Fourth Review Conference: 
 
-  Their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the Convention; 
 
- Their recognition that purposes of this Convention include the prohibition of the use 
of biological weapons as contrary to the purpose of the Convention. 
 
The first of these subparagraphs has clearly been subsumed into the new subparagraph: 
 
-  Their recognition of the particular importance of responding to the threat posed by 
biological weapons by strengthening the Convention including through binding 
measures agreed by all States Parties. 
 
The second subparagraph addressing the prohibition of use could, we recommend, usefully 
be added with "reaffirmation" replacing "recognition": 
 
- Their reaffirmation that purposes of this Convention include the prohibition of the 
use of biological weapons as contrary to the purpose of the Convention. 
 
In addition, the opening words of the Solemn Declaration will need to be updated to read " ... 
WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 19 NOVEMBER TO 7 DECEMBER 2001 AND FROM 11 
TO 22 NOVEMBER 2002 TO REVIEW...".  Finally, we recommend that the typographical 
error in the second line of the third subparagraph be corrected to read "(Biological)". 
  
Preamble 
 
                                                 
9See page 142, paragraph 7 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening 
the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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8.  The paragraph in the draft Final Declaration is identical to that in the Final Declaration of 
the Fourth Review Conference with the insertion of the word "the" prior to "review" in the 
first line.  No changes are recommended. 
 
Article I 
 
9.  The draft Article I section consists of twelve paragraphs of which nine were agreed and 
three -- in bold -- were not yet agreed: 
 
1. The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the provision which 
defines the scope of the Convention.  The Conference reaffirms its support for the 
provisions of this Article. 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms that the Convention prohibits the development, 
production, stockpiling, other acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological 
agents or toxins harmful to plants and animals, as well as humans, of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes. 
 
3. The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and 
under any circumstances, including within their own territory, of microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins, as well as of weapons, equipment or means of 
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
conflict, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention. 
 
4. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict, including by transmission by means of vectors of 
biological origin, in order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their 
use. 
 
5. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or 
altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, 
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes. 
 
6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, 
biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications resulting 
from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with 
the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking 
given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. 
 
7. The Conference notes that experimentation involving open-air release of 
pathogens or toxins harmful to humans is inconsistent with the undertakings 
contained in Article I; experimentation involving open-air release of pathogens or 
toxins harmful to animals or plants that has no justification for prophylactic, 
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protective or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the undertakings 
contained in Article I. 
 
8. The Conference appeals through the States Parties to their scientific 
communities to lend their support only to activities that have justification for 
prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes, and refrain from undertaking or 
supporting activities which are in breach of the obligations deriving from provisions 
of the Convention. 
 
9. The Conference condemns the use of all biological agents or toxins, including 
anthrax, as tools of terrorism and finds such acts reprehensible. 
 
10. The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital importance of full 
implementation by all States Parties of all the provisions of the Convention, 
especially Article I.  The Conference calls upon all States Parties and Signatories to 
comply fully with their obligations on the basis of the conviction that any non-
compliance with its provisions could undermine confidence in, and achieving the 
basic provisions of, the Convention. 
 
10.  The language has largely been developed from that in the Final Declaration of the Fourth 
Review Conference.   Much of this had been agreed using language essentially the same as at 
the Fourth Review Conference.  Interestingly, one reaffirmation had an agreed extension to 
include "transmission by means of vectors of biological origin" so that this now read: 
 
The Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment or 
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in 
armed conflict, including by transmission by means of vectors of biological origin, in 
order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use. [Underlining 
indicates new language from that agreed at the Fourth Review Conference] 
 
11.   However, in the light of the pace of scientific and technological developments since the 
Fourth Review Conference, it is surprising that two of the paragraphs agreed in November 
2001 are unchanged from the 1996 Final Declaration.  These are the paragraphs relating to 
the scope of the Convention: 
 
5. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or 
altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, 
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes. 
 
and the apprehensions paragraph: 
 
6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, 
biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications resulting 
from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with 
the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking 
given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. 
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12.  In the Key Points we had recommended10 that in view of growing knowledge of the 
dangers of prion diseases, the increasing capabilities for manipulation of receptors and 
ligands in the nervous, endocrine and immune systems, and the growing understanding of 
how proteins may be designed for particular purposes, the scope paragraph be amended by 
the addition of an explanatory sentence to read as follows: 
 
5.  The  Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or 
altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, 
of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes.  Consequently, prions, proteins and bioregulators and their 
synthetically produced analogues and components are covered. [Added language 
shown in bold] 
 
13.  In addition, we recommended11 firstly that it should be made clear that the scientific and 
technological developments that could be of concern apply to animals and plants as well as 
to human beings and secondly that because the genomics revolution is impacting on all 
aspects of biology and medicine, the process of adding discrete new topics that are causing 
apprehension could be misleading.  It would be clearer and better to use language making it 
clear that developments throughout the whole of the life sciences could potentially be of 
concern.   This could then be complemented with an explanatory sentence mentioning some 
of the specific recent areas in which significant advances have occurred along the lines of 
"Consequently, genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics are covered."   Consequently, the  
apprehensions paragraph should be amended to read as follows: 
 
6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the life sciences in animals and plants as 
well as in humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the 
objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertakings given 
by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such  developments. Consequently, 
genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics are covered. [Added language shown in 
bold] 
 
14. The importance of developing the language in paragraphs 5 and 6 from that agreed at the 
Fourth Review Conference is emphasised by considering the way in which the language in 
the Article I section of the Final Declaration relating to scientific and technological advances 
of relevance to the Convention which have addressed both the scope and the apprehensions 
caused by recent developments.   In regard to the scope of the Convention, the extended 
understandings that have developed at successive Review Conferences in the language in the 
Article I section of the Final Declaration are summarised in the table below where the 
developments are emphasised in bold: 
 
                                                 
10See page 25, paragraph 41 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
11See page 24, paragraph 39 and 40 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Convention 
(Article I) 
Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
First Rev Con The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently 
comprehensive to have covered recent scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. 
Second Rev Con ... the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially 
created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production.  
Third Rev Con ... the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial agents or toxins, 
naturally or artificially created or altered, whatever their origin or method 
of production.  
Fourth Rev Con ... the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological 
agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as 
their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types 
and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes. 
 
In a similar way, successive Review Conferences have extended the understandings regarding 
the apprehensions raised by recent developments by reaffirming that the undertaking given 
by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.   The table below shows 
how the apprehensions addressed have been extended by successive Review Conferences 
where the developments are emphasised in bold: 
 
Convention Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
First Rev Con The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently 
comprehensive to have covered recent scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. 
Second Rev Con ... apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological 
developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, 
Third Rev Con ... apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological 
developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering 
and biotechnology,  
Fourth Rev Con ... apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological 
developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting 
from genome studies, 
 
15.  Against this background, the realization that the relevant scientific and technological 
developments have burgeoned during the past five years and that biotechnology is seen as the 
technology of the 21st Century makes it even more critical that the Fifth Review Conference 
should in its Final Declaration further extend the understandings relating to both the scope 
and the apprehensions arising from relevant developments.12  We recommend that the fifth 
                                                 
12Graham S. Pearson, New Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the Fifth Review 
Conference,  University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 3, July 2001.  
Available at http://www. brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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and sixth paragraphs be extended as proposed in the Key Points and reproduced above in 
paragraphs 12 and 13. 
 
16.  Three paragraphs in the Article I section of the draft Final Declaration are not yet agreed.  
The first one reaffirms that use, in any way and under any circumstances, is a violation of 
Article I : 
 
3.  The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under 
any circumstances, including within their own territory, of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins, as well as of weapons, equipment or means of delivery 
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, that is 
not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a 
violation of Article I of the Convention. [Underlining indicates new language from 
that agreed at the Fourth Review Conference] 
 
The proposed additional language, underlined above, contains two valuable extensions -- the 
first to explicitly state "including within their own territory" and the second to extend the 
reaffirmation to include "weapons, equipment and means of delivery" -- which are welcomed.  
We recommend inclusion of the additional underlined language. 
 
17.  The second paragraph contains two formulations relating to experimentation involving 
open-air release of pathogens or toxins.   
 
7.  The Conference notes that experimentation involving open-air release 
of pathogens or toxins harmful to humans is inconsistent with the undertakings 
contained in Article I; experimentation involving open-air release of pathogens or 
toxins harmful to animals or plants that has no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the undertakings contained 
in Article I. [Underlining indicates new language from that agreed at the Fourth 
Review Conference] 
 
The second formulation is identical to that agreed in 1996.  The new alternative formulation 
would appear to be more all embracing and to exclude any possibility that such open-air 
experimentation might have justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful 
purposes.  As open-air releases of pathogens or toxins are used for biocontrol of plants for 
peaceful purposes, the new formulation is unnecessarily restrictive and is thus not 
recommended.  We therefore recommend language identical to that in the 1996 Final 
Declaration: 
 
7.  The Conference notes that experimentation involving open-air release of 
pathogens or toxins harmful to animals or plants that has no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the 
undertakings contained in Article I. 
 
18.  The third paragraph emphasizes the importance of full implementation of all provisions 
of the Convention and especially of Article I: 
 
10. The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital importance of full 
implementation by all States Parties of all the provisions of the Convention, especially 
Article I. The Conference calls upon all States Parties and Signatories to comply fully 
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with their obligations on the basis of the conviction that any non-compliance with its 
provisions could undermine confidence in, and achieving the basic provisions of, the 
Convention. [Underlining indicates new language from that agreed at the Fourth 
Review Conference] 
 
The corresponding paragraph in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference was: 
 
9. The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital importance of full implementation 
by all States Parties of all the provisions of the Convention, especially Articles I, II 
and III. The Conference agrees that the application by States Parties of positive 
approaches in accordance with the provisions of the Convention is in the interest of 
all States Parties and that any non-compliance with its provisions could undermine 
confidence in the Convention. Non-compliance should be treated with determination 
in all cases, without selectivity or discrimination.  
 
The new language proposed for the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference 
provides a useful reiteration of the importance of all States Parties and Signatories complying 
fully with their obligations and on this basis, we recommend the inclusion of the new 
underlined language.  We also recommend the inclusion of the final sentence from the 1996 
Final Declaration language that  "Non-compliance should be treated with determination in 
all cases, without selectivity or discrimination." as this does need to be reaffirmed by the 
Fifth Review Conference.  
 
Article II 
 
19.   The draft Article II section consists of two agreed paragraphs: 
 
1. The Conference recognizes that for any State acceding to the Convention after 
the entry into force of the Convention, the destruction or diversion to peaceful 
purposes specified in Article II would be completed upon accession to the Convention.  
The Conference emphasizes that the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes 
specified in Article II should be carried out completely and effectively. 
 
2. The Conference stresses that states, which become parties to the Convention, 
in implementing the provisions of this Article, shall observe all necessary safety 
precautions to protect populations and the environment. 
 
These are identical to the first and fourth paragraphs of the Fourth Review Conference Final 
Declaration.  In the Key Points, we had proposed13 that the second sentence of the first 
paragraph be extended by addition of the words "and affirms that any past biological 
weapons facilities should likewise be destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes." as such an 
extension would provide a useful strengthening of the BTWC regime by affirming the 
requirement for the conversion to peaceful purposes or destruction of all facilities which 
participated in past offensive biological weapon programmes and/or activities.   We 
recommend that the first paragraph be amended to read: 
 
                                                 
13See pages 33 & 34, paragraphs 12 to 16 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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1. The Conference recognizes that for any State acceding to the Convention after the 
entry into force of the Convention, the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes 
specified in Article II would be completed upon accession to the Convention. The 
Conference emphasizes that the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes 
specified in Article II should be carried out completely and effectively and affirms 
that any past biological weapons facilities should likewise be destroyed or diverted 
to peaceful purposes. [Additional language in bold] 
  
20. The second and third paragraphs of the Fourth Review Conference Final Declaration 
which have been omitted are those which stated that: 
 
2. The Conference notes the importance of Article II and welcomes the statements 
made by States which have become Parties to the Convention since the Third Review 
Conference that they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of 
delivery referred to in Article I of the Convention.  
 
3. The Conference notes that the submission to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of 
appropriate information on destruction by States Parties which had stockpiles and 
have destroyed them in fulfilment of their Article II obligations and which have not 
already made such submissions could enhance confidence in the Convention and its 
objectives.  
 
Although both of these paragraphs were included in the Key Points proposed language, we 
recommend the reinsertion of the third paragraph, amended as shown below in bold, as this 
needs to be included in the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference;  the second 
paragraph can be safely omitted.  
 
3. The Conference notes that the submission to the Department for Disarmament 
Affairs of appropriate information on destruction by States Parties which had 
stockpiles and have destroyed them in fulfilment of their Article II obligations, and of 
appropriate information on destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of any 
past biological weapons facilities, when sufficiently specific as to types, quantities, 
location and the date and method of the destruction or diversion to peaceful 
purposes, may enhance confidence in the Convention and its objectives, and calls on 
States Parties which had stockpiles or facilities and which have not already made 
such submissions to make them without delay.  
 
This new wording takes into account the proposed extension of "biological weapons 
facilities" to paragraph 1 and also encourages the provision of specific details (types, 
quantities, location and the date and method of the destruction or diversion to peaceful 
purposes), which are not required by the present CBM Form F format which simply requires a 
date when the past offensive programme ended, but which would help build confidence when 
sufficiently specific.  In addition, the wording renews the call for such submissions first 
made in the second sentence of the second paragraph of the Article II section of the 1980 
Final Declaration14 which stated that: 
 
                                                 
14United Nations, The First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, BWC/CONF.I/10, Geneva 1980.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc and at http://www.opbw.org 
 
14 
The Conference believes that such voluntary declarations contribute to increased 
confidence in the Convention and believes that States not having made such voluntary 
declarations should do so. [Emphasis added] 
 
It would be better to call for such submissions rather than just welcome those already made as 
in the language of subsequent Final Declarations. 
 
Article III 
 
21.  The draft Article III section consists of nine paragraphs of which the first seven are 
agreed  and the last two -- shown in bold below -- have not yet been agreed.  This is in 
contrast to the four paragraphs in the Article III section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The 
draft Article III section states that: 
 
1. The Conference recognises the continuing importance of Article III and 
affirms that its provisions are sufficiently comprehensive to cover transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, at international, national and sub-
national levels. 
 
2. The Conference notes that a number of States Parties stated that they have 
taken concrete measures to give effect to their undertakings under this Article, and in 
this context also notes statements by States Parties at the Conference about the 
legislative and administrative measures they have taken since the Fourth Review 
Conference. 
 
3. The Conference calls for appropriate measures by all States Parties, within 
their constitutional and legislative procedures, to ensure effective implementation of 
this Article. The Conference underlines that transfers relevant to the Convention 
should be authorised only for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. 
 
4. The Conference urges States Parties to take appropriate measures to prevent 
and respond to any violation, including by individuals or sub-national groups, of 
transfer regulations or legislation, including the qualification of such a violation as a 
punishable offence, consistent with the provisions of the Convention. 
 
5. The Conference stresses that any recipient, including a State not party, must 
be prevented from acquiring biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
weapons, equipment or means of delivery, and information that would assist the 
development, production, stockpiling and means of delivery of biological and toxin 
weapons. 
 
6. The Conference emphasises that terrorists and terrorist groups should be 
prohibited from receiving materials and capabilities relevant to the Convention. 
 
7. The Conference reiterates that the provisions of this Article should not be used 
to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfers for purposes consistent with 
the objectives and purposes of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, 
equipment and materials under Article X. 
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8. The Conference encourages States Parties to consider, within the 
framework of the Convention, ways to enhance the implementation of this Article, 
including elaboration of a set of common principles and guidelines in the field of 
export controls. 
 
9. The Conference takes note with interest of the provisions of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety which addresses, inter alia, transboundary movements of 
living genetically modified organisms. 
 
22.  The first, second and seventh agreed paragraphs have been developed from the language 
in corresponding paragraphs in the Article III section of the Fourth Review Conference Final 
Declaration.  The third paragraph is elaborated from what had previously been the second 
sentence of the second paragraph.  The  fourth, fifth and sixth agreed paragraphs are new: 
 
4. The Conference urges States Parties to take appropriate measures to prevent 
and respond to any violation, including by individuals or sub-national groups, of 
transfer regulations or legislation, including the qualification of such a violation as a 
punishable offence, consistent with the provisions of the Convention. 
 
5. The Conference stresses that any recipient, including a State not party, must 
be prevented from acquiring biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
weapons, equipment or means of delivery, and information that would assist the 
development, production, stockpiling and means of delivery of biological and toxin 
weapons. 
 
6. The Conference emphasises that terrorists and terrorist groups should be 
prohibited from receiving materials and capabilities relevant to the Convention. 
 
These additions are welcomed as they rightly emphasise the importance of preventing any 
recipient from acquiring biological agents or toxins; weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery; and information that would assist in the development, production and delivery of 
biological and toxin weapons.   It is also made clear that the measures to implement Article 
III of the Convention are to prevent and respond to any violation, including by individuals or 
sub-national groups, and that terrorists are to be prohibited from receiving such materials or 
capabilities. 
 
23.  The first of the paragraphs not agreed states that: 
 
8. The Conference encourages States Parties to consider, within the 
framework of the Convention, ways to enhance the implementation of this Article, 
including elaboration of a set of common principles and guidelines in the field of 
export controls. 
 
This is a development of the language in the first sentence of the third paragraph of the 
Fourth Review Conference Final Declaration which states that: 
 
3.  The Conference discussed the question whether multilaterally-agreed 
guidelines or multilateral guidelines negotiated by all States Parties to 
the Convention concerning the transfer of biological agents, materials and technology 
for peaceful purposes to any recipient whatsoever might strengthen the Convention.  
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The proposed new language is somewhat stronger in that it encourages States Parties to 
consider ways to enhance the implementation of Article III  including elaboration of a set of 
principles and guidelines in the field of export controls.   We have pointed out previously in 
several Bradford Briefing Papers15 that increasingly all States -- north and south, east and 
west -- are increasingly concerned about imports and exports of dangerous materials and that 
governments increasingly are seeking to monitor and control such imports and exports.  
Given the world-wide concern about biological terrorism, there would be benefits from States 
Parties considering ways to enhance the implementation of Article III.  Consequently, we 
recommend agreement of the language in this paragraph. 
 
24.  The second paragraph not agreed states that:  
 
9. The Conference takes note with interest of the provisions of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety which addresses, inter alia, transboundary movements of 
living genetically modified organisms. 
 
This paragraph is unexceptional.  The 1996 Final Declaration in its Article X section included 
the following language:  
 
9. The Conference takes note of the significant steps forward in promoting 
cooperation in the biological field taken by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, including the 
adoption of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, and by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and underlines their importance in the context of Article X implementation. 
 
The recent agreement of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is but a development of 
language in one of the Articles of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the provisions 
in the Cartagena Protocol for advance informed agreement for transboundary movements of 
living modified organisms is clearly of relevance and interest to the States Parties to the 
BTWC.  We recommend agreement of the language in this paragraph. 
 
Article IV 
 
25.  The draft Article IV section consists of fourteen paragraphs of which ten are agreed, two 
(paragraphs 4 and 8) are agreed apart from one or two words, and the last two -- shown in 
bold below -- have not yet been agreed.  This is in contrast to the seven paragraphs in the 
Article IV section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article IV section states that: 
 
1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV.  It reaffirms the 
commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this 
Article, in accordance with their constitutional processes.  These measures are to 
ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere within their territory, under 
their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes 
contrary to the Convention.  The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through 
                                                 
15See for example Graham S. Pearson, The BTWC Protocol:  Improving the Implementation of Article III of the 
Convention: Pragmatic Considerations, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper 
No. 33, February 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfillment of their 
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and 
toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity. 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the 
Convention. 
 
3. The Conference notes those measures taken by a number of States Parties in 
this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to 
any State Party that has not yet taken the necessary measures to do so immediately, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within its 
territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference invites 
each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with 
international law, the application of such measures also to actions taken anywhere by 
natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
4. The Conference encourages States Parties to adopt promptly, in accordance 
with their constitutional processes, measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring 
biological agents or toxins, dual use equipment and information on the production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and 
means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, anywhere within their 
territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control.  The Conference calls upon 
States to make all possible efforts to prevent all terrorist acts including bio-terrorist 
acts in all their forms and manifestations. 
 
5. The Conference stresses the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance 
domestic compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation, regulations and other measures regarding the physical 
protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and 
removal of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins; 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions 
contained in the Biological and Toxin weapons Convention and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925; 
 
- Efforts by industry and scientific community to develop codes of 
conduct and/or ethical standards for work relevant to the prohibitions of the 
Convention, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of States Parties 
to adopt legislative, administrative and other measures to implement the 
provisions of the Convention.  Such codes could include, inter alia, a 
statement that scientists will use their knowledge and skills for the 
advancement of human welfare and will not conduct any activities directed 
toward use of microorganisms or toxins or other biological agents for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict. 
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6. The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties might 
undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the 
effectiveness of the Convention, as requested by previous Review Conferences. 
 
7. The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the Second 
Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs information on the texts of specific legislation enacted or other 
measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference 
invites these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide such 
information and texts in the future. The Conference further notes that some States 
Parties have provided information in response to the confidence-building measure 
agreed to at the Third Review Conference entitled “Declaration of legislation, 
regulations and other measures”. The Conference encourages all States Parties to 
provide such information in the future. In addition, the Conference encourages all 
States Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of such 
measures. 
 
8. The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, including regional 
ones, towards the strengthening and implementation of the Biological and Toxin 
weapons Convention regime. 
 
9. The Conference calls upon each State Party to consider to adopt and 
implement national regulations to establish and maintain the protection of biological 
agents and toxins considered to be dangerous and relevant to the objectives of the 
Convention, including regulations on who may posses or acquire them and where and 
how they may be handled as well as regulations governing domestic and international 
transfers, and to enforce all such regulations by legislative or administrative 
measures, including penal measures, as appropriate. 
 
10. The Conference encourages each State Party to consider adopting and 
implementing, if it is not yet the case, national guidelines for genetic engineering 
work consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Convention. 
 
11. The Conference urges each State Party to provide appropriate legal 
assistance, in accordance with their national legislation and international 
agreements, in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings 
relating to the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use by natural 
persons or legal entities of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. 
 
12. The Conference calls on each State Party to enhance its ability to prosecute 
or, where appropriate, extradite individuals for biological weapons offenses, in 
accordance with their national law and bilateral extradition agreements. 
 
13. The Conference invites States Parties to consider, as appropriate, the 
negotiation of legal agreements to prevent and eliminate crimes involving 
biological and toxin weapons. 
 
14. The Conference notes also that some States Parties have provided proposals 
and suggestions of further strengthening international law and relevant national 
legislation, and believe those proposals and suggestions are worthy of further 
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exploration and consideration. The Conference also welcomes and encourages 
other States Parties to provide relevant comments, suggestions and proposals in this 
regard. 
 
26.  The first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs are either identical to 
or developed slightly from those in the 1996 Final Declaration.  Of note is the extension of 
the fifth paragraph to include an additional subparagraph stating that: 
 
- Efforts by industry and scientific community to develop codes of conduct 
and/or ethical standards for work relevant to the prohibitions of the Convention, 
without prejudice to the primary responsibility of States Parties to adopt legislative, 
administrative and other measures to implement the provisions of the Convention.  
Such codes could include, inter alia, a statement that scientists will use their 
knowledge and skills for the advancement of human welfare and will not conduct any 
activities directed toward use of microorganisms or toxins or other biological agents 
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
 
The increased emphasis in paragraph five from the 1996 words "The Conference notes the 
importance of" to "The Conference stresses the importance of" is welcomed.  In addition, in 
the third line of the third subparagraph of paragraph five, the typographical error in the draft 
should be corrected so as to read "Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention". 
 
27.  Although the third paragraph is identical to that agreed in the 1996 Final Declaration, we 
proposed16 in the Key Points that, because of the greater awareness internationally of 
biological terrorism, the language should be slightly strengthened by amending the phrase 
reading "for example the adoption of penal legislation" to read "including the adoption of 
penal legislation".  The remainder of the paragraph would then apply fully and 
unambiguously to national measures including the adoption of penal legislation.  This would 
represent an extended understanding pf the implications of Article IV on an issue which has 
achieved an even greater urgency since 1996.  We recommend that "for example" in the 
second line be replaced by "including". 
 
28.  The one word not yet agreed in the eighth paragraph is the final word "regime."  As the 
eighth paragraph is identical to that agreed in 1996, we recommend that the word "regime" 
be agreed. 
 
29.  The new agreed paragraphs are paragraphs four, nine, ten, eleven and twelve.  In the 
fourth paragraph two words "promptly" in line 1 and "dual use" in line 3 are not yet agreed.  
This paragraph encourages States Parties to adopt promptly measures to prevent terrorists 
from acquiring biological agents, dual use equipment  and information -- and as such it 
largely parallels the language in the paragraph agreed in the Article III part of the draft Final 
Declaration which stated that: 
 
5.    The Conference stresses that any recipient, including a State not party, must be 
prevented from acquiring biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
weapons, equipment or means of delivery, and information that would assist the 
                                                 
16See pages 57 and 58, paragraph 26 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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development, production, stockpiling and means of delivery of biological and toxin 
weapons. 
 
Insofar as the two words not yet agreed in the fourth paragraph in the draft Final Declaration 
are concerned, the word "promptly" has been used previously in the language in Final 
Declarations and the encouragement to adopt measures promptly is sensible given the world-
wide concern about biological terrorism.  We therefore recommend agreement of the word 
"promptly."  The use of "dual-use" appears to be redundant as the word "equipment" is 
clearly placed in context by the continuation of the fourth paragraph and consequently we 
recommend deletion of "dual-use." 
 
30.  The new ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth paragraphs address national regulations for the 
control of biological agents and toxins considered to be dangerous, national guidelines for 
genetic engineering, provision of legal assistance and enhanced prosecution and extradition 
capabilities respectively are all welcomed. 
 
31.  The two paragraphs not yet agreed are the thirteenth and fourteenth.  The thirteenth 
invites States Parties to consider, as appropriate, the negotiation of legal agreements to 
prevent and eliminate crimes involving biological and toxin weapons.  In principle, this is to 
be encouraged as the omission of explicit mention of biological and toxin weapons in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court should be rectified and proposals such as 
those put forward by the Harvard-Sussex Program for a Convention to Prohibit Biological 
and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law17 that would complement the 
prohibitions of the BTWC and the CWC, as it would make it a crime under international law 
for any person knowingly to develop produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use biological or 
chemical weapons or knowingly to order, direct or render substantial assistance to those 
activities or to threaten to use biological or chemical weapons, should be explored and taken 
forward.  We recommend that the thirteenth paragraph be agreed.   
 
32.  The fourteenth paragraph is much less focussed than the other paragraphs in the Article 
IV section of the draft Final Declaration and largely appears to repeat some of the language 
already agreed.  We recommend that the fourteenth paragraph be deleted. 
 
 
 
Article V 
 
33.  The draft Article V section consists of nine paragraphs of which seven are agreed and 
two -- paragraphs 3 and 9 shown in bold below -- have not yet been agreed.  This is one more 
than the eight paragraphs in the Article V section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft 
Article V section states that: 
 
1. The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation 
assumed by States Parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any 
problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the 
provisions of, the Convention.  The Conference reiterates its appeal to States Parties 
made at the Third Review Conference to make all possible efforts to solve any 
                                                 
17The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, The Draft Convention to Prohibit 
Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law, November 2001.  Available at http://fas -
www.harvard.edu/~hsp/crim01.pdf 
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problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the 
provisions of the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of 
the provisions subscribed to.  The Conference notes that this Article provides an 
appropriate framework for resolving any such problems, and reaffirms that any State 
Party which identifies such a problem should, as a rule, use these procedures to 
address and resolve it. 
 
2. The Conference also reviewed the operation of the procedures to strengthen 
the implementation of the provisions of Article V which were adopted in the Final 
Declaration of the Third Review Conference and which built on the agreements 
reached at the Second Review Conference.  The Conference notes that the 
implementation provisions were invoked since the Fourth Review Conference and 
calls on any State Party which identifies a problem arising in relation to the objective 
of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention to use these procedures, if 
appropriate, to address and resolve it. 
 
3. The Conference stresses the need for all State Parties to deal effectively and 
promptly with compliance issues.  In this connection, States Parties reconfirm their 
agreement to provide specific, timely responses in solving any problems which may 
arise in the application of any provision of the Convention.  Such responses should 
be submitted, if appropriate, in accordance with the procedures agreed upon by the 
Second Review Conference and further developed by the Third Review Conference. 
The Conference reiterates its request that information on such efforts be provided 
to the Review Conferences.  The Conference reaffirms that consultation and 
cooperation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate 
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in 
accordance with its Charter. 
 
4. The Conference stresses its determination to strengthen effectiveness and 
improve the implementation of the Convention, and its recognition that effective 
verification could reinforce the Convention. 
 
5. In accordance with the decision of the Fourth Review Conference, the 
Conference reviewed the effectiveness of the confidence building measures as agreed 
in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference and reaffirmed at the Fourth 
Review Conference.  The Conference notes the continued importance of the 
confidence building measures agreed upon at the Second and Third Review 
Conferences, as well as the modalities elaborated by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific 
and Technical Experts from States Parties to the Convention, held in 1987. 
 
6. The Conference notes the background information document providing, in 
summary tabular form, data on the participation of States Parties in the agreed 
confidence building measures since the last Review Conference. 
 
7. The conference recognizes that participation with confidence building 
measures since last review conference has not been satisfactory nor universal and 
that not all responses have been prompt or complete.  In this regard, the Conference 
urges all States parties to complete full and timely declarations in the future, noting 
the value of nil returns.  The Conference further reminds all States Parties of the 
importance of submitting their CBMs to the United Nations by the 15 April each year.  
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In this regard, the Conference also recognizes the technical difficulties experienced 
by some States Parties with respect to preparing CBM responses. 
 
8. The conference invites States Parties to consider setting up or designating a 
national entity responsible for the national implementation of the CBMs. 
 
9. The Conference takes note of proposals to expand the scope of existing 
confidence building measures, to improve existing measures and to create new 
measures, in order to provide a broader range of relevant information, consistent 
with the approach agreed upon in 1991.  Therefore, the Conference invites States 
Parties to further discuss modifications of CBMs. 
 
34.   The first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs are either identical to or developed 
slightly from those in the 1996 Final Declaration.  In the second sentence of the first 
paragraph we recommend that the words "and reiterated at the Fourth Review Confernce" 
be inserted after "The Conference reiterates its appeal to States Parties made at the Third 
Review Conference" to show the continuity of this appeal through successive Review 
Conferences.   Of note is the inclusion in the second paragraph in the second sentence of the 
words "The Conference notes that the implementation provisions were invoked since the 
Fourth Review Conference" in place of the words in the 1996 Final Declaration "While 
noting that these procedures have not yet been invoked, the Conference reaffirmed their 
present validity."  Given the concerns that have been expressed about compliance at the 
opening session of the Fifth Review Conference, there is much to be said for the reiteration of 
the language reaffirming the validity of the procedures.  We therefore recommend 
amendment of the second and third sentences of the second paragraph so that they read "The 
Conference notes that the implementation provisions were invoked since the Fourth Review 
Conference and reaffirms their continuing validity.  The Conference calls upon ... " in 
which the new language is in bold. 
 
35.  The sixth paragraph corresponds to the first sentence of the fifth paragraph in the 1996 
Final Declaration with the addition of the words "providing, in summary tabular form, data".   
The seventh paragraph which sets out the unsatisfactory basis of the annual responses to the 
agreed confidence-building measures is developed from the rest of the fifth paragraph of the 
1996 Final Declaration and usefully includes recognition of the value of nil returns.  We 
recommend that the typographical error in the fourth line of the seventh paragraph is 
corrected so as to read "States Parties". The new eighth paragraph invites States Parties to set 
up or designate a national entity for the national implementation of the CBMs which is to be 
welcomed although this needs to be taken further by asking States Parties to advise the 
United Nations of this national entity thereby enabling States Parties to be able to approach 
the national entity  for the purposes of consultation and cooperation in respect of the CBM 
declarations.  We recommend extension of the eighth paragraph to read "... national 
implementation of the CBMs and to advise the United Nations of the name and address of 
the national entity." in which the new language is in bold. 
 
36.  The two paragraphs not yet agreed are the third and ninth paragraphs.  The new ninth 
paragraph which is not yet agreed contains language inviting States Parties to further discuss 
modifications of CBMs.   Given that useful proposals were submitted in the initial session of 
the Fifth Review Conference by South Africa and by the European Union, there would be 
benefit in the Final Declaration using language similar to that agreed in the Article V section 
of the Final Declaration of the 1986 Second Review Conference which set up an ad hoc 
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meeting in April 1987 to finalize the modalities for the CBMs.  The language agreed in 1986 
was that: 
 
The Conference decides to hold an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts 
from the States Parties to finalise the modalities for the exchange of information and 
data by working out, inter alia, appropriate forms to be used by the States Parties for 
the exchange of information agreed to in this Final Declaration, thus enabling States 
Parties to follow a standardised procedure.  The group shall meet in Geneva for the 
period 31 March - 15 April 1987 and shall communicate the results of the work to the 
States Parties immediately thereafter. 
 
We recommend that the ninth paragraph be amended to read as follows in which the new 
language is in bold: 
 
9.  The Conference takes note of proposals to expand the scope of existing confidence 
building measures, to improve existing measures and to create new measures, in 
order to provide a broader range of relevant information, consistent with the 
approach agreed upon in 1991 and decides to hold an ad hoc meeting of the States 
Parties to finalise the modalities for these measures by working out, inter alia, 
appropriate forms to be used by the States Parties.  The group shall meet in Geneva 
for the period [31 March - 11 April 2003] and shall communicate the results of the 
work to the States Parties immediately thereafter.  
 
37.  The new third paragraph which is not yet agreed starts by stressing the need for all States 
Parties to deal effectively and promptly with compliance issues and is closely similar to the 
language agreed in the eighth paragraph of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The second sentence 
is, however, broader as it states that "In this connection, States Parties reconfirm their 
agreement to provide specific, timely responses in solving any problems which may arise in 
the application of any provision of the Convention." than the more narrowly focussed 
language agreed in the 1996 Final Declaration  which stated that "In this connection, the 
States Parties had agreed to provide a specific, timely response to any compliance concern 
alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention."  The broadening to "any 
problems which may arise in the application of any provision" is welcomed as being 
consistent with the broad scope of the obligation to consult and cooperate under Article V.  
The third and fourth sentences in the draft Final Declaration are closely similar to those 
agreed in 1996.  The final sentence is identical to the sentence agreed as the third paragraph 
of the 1996 Final Declaration.  We recommend that the third paragraph be agreed.  
 
Article VI 
 
38.  The draft Article VI section consists of seven paragraphs of which five are agreed, one 
(paragraph 5) is agreed apart from a single phrase and one -- paragraphs 4 shown in bold 
below -- has not yet been agreed.  This is the same number of paragraphs as in the Article VI 
section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article VI section states that: 
 
1. The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked. 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VI, which, in addition to 
the procedures contained in Article V, provides that any State Party which finds that 
any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention may 
lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council.  The Conference 
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emphasizes the provision of Article VI that such a complaint should include all 
possible evidence and documents confirming its validity.  It stresses that, as in the 
case of the implementation of all the provisions and procedures set forth in the 
Convention, the procedures foreseen in Article VI should be implemented in good 
faith within the scope of the Convention. 
 
3. The Conference invites the Security Council to consider immediately any 
complaint lodged under Article VI and to initiate any measures it considers necessary 
for the investigation of the complaint in accordance with the Charter.  The 
Conference reaffirms the undertaking of each State Party to cooperate in carrying out 
any investigations which the Security Council may initiate. 
 
4. The Conference invites States Parties to consider the development by all 
States Parties of a compliance mechanism within the framework of the Convention 
to conduct investigations regarding alleged breaches of the Convention. 
 
5. The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security Council 
resolution 620 (1988), which at the time encouraged the United Nations Secretary-
General to carry out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to its 
attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that could entail a violation of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol or of any other applicable rule of international treaty or customary 
law.  The Conference also recalls the technical guidelines and procedures contained 
in Annex I of United Nations document A/44/561 to guide the United Nations 
Secretary-General on the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible 
use of such weapons.  The States Parties reaffirm their agreement to consult, at the 
request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the 
United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations.  Pending the 
establishment of the mechanism described in the paragraph above, the Conference 
stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nations is called upon to take 
appropriate measures expeditiously, which could include a request to the Security 
Council to consider action in accordance with the Charter. 
 
6. The Conference invites the Security Council to inform each State Party of the 
results of any investigation initiated under Article VI and to consider promptly any 
appropriate further action which may be necessary. 
 
7. The Conference notes that the procedure outlined in this Article is without 
prejudice to the prerogative of the States Parties to the Convention to consider jointly 
the cases of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention and to 
make appropriate decisions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
applicable rules of international law. 
 
39.  The first, third, sixth and seventh paragraphs are identical to those in the 1996 Final 
Declaration.  The second paragraph is also identical apart from the deletion of a sentence in 
the corresponding paragraph in the 1996 Final Declaration that referred to any future 
verification regime resulting from the Ad Hoc Group.  The fifth paragraph is also identical to 
the corresponding paragraph in the 1996 Final Declaration apart from the insertion of a clause 
not yet agreed at the start of the final sentence "Pending the establishment of the mechanism 
described in the paragraph above,"  that refers to the not yet agreed fourth paragraph. 
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40.  The not yet agreed fourth paragraph invites States Parties to consider the development by 
all States Parties of a compliance mechanism to conduct investigations regarding alleged 
breaches of the Convention.  If this language had been proposed for the Article VI section of 
the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, it would probably have been agreed 
without undue difficulty as in an ideal world, States Parties would wish to consider 
development of such a mechanism.  In reality, this paragraph is being proposed to the Fifth 
Review Conference following the United States rejection of the composite Protocol which 
included a carefully elaborated compliance mechanism that would have enabled 
investigations to be conducted of alleged breaches of the Convention.    The way18 in which 
the United States rejected the Protocol -- and has continued to take every opportunity to 
denigrate the Protocol -- has effectively poisoned the multilateral framework so that 
otherwise reasonable proposals have little or no chance of being accepted. 
 
41.  In the Key Points we recognised that any cross reference to the work of the Ad Hoc 
Group in the Final Declaration would be unlikely to attract consensus and consequently we 
proposed19 language that referred to "any future legally-binding instrument to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention".  Consequently, there would 
be advantage in considering further the language developed in the Key Points from that in the 
final paragraph of the 1996 Final Declaration which proposed that: 
 
7. The Conference notes that provisions for investigating alleged breaches of the 
Convention, including measures for the investigation of alleged use of biological and 
toxin weapons, continue to be considered in regard to the negotiations of a legally-
binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of 
the Convention, in accordance with its mandate. 
 
We recommend that the fourth paragraph be amended to read as follows, with new language 
in bold:   
 
4. The Conference invites States Parties when considering the development of a 
legally-binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention to include a compliance mechanism to conduct 
investigations regarding alleged breaches of the Convention. 
 
The linked phrase not yet agreed in the fifth paragraph could then be agreed without change. 
 
Article VII 
 
                                                 
18See the analysis in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The US Rejection of the 
Composite Protocol: A Huge Mistake based on Illogical Assessments, University of Bradford, Department of 
Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper No 22, August 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc Available 
at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc and also in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, 
The US Statement at the Fifth Review Conference: Compounding the Error in Rejecting the Composite 
Protocol, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No 4, January 2002. 
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
19See pages 72 to 74, paragraphs 5 to 11 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ acad/sbtwc 
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42. The draft Article VII section consists of six paragraphs which are all agreed.  This is one 
paragraph more than in the Article VII section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft 
Article VII section states that: 
  
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that these provisions have not been 
invoked. 
 
2. The Conference underlines the importance of Article VII and reaffirms the 
undertaking made by each State Party to provide or support assistance in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations to any Party to the Convention which so 
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger 
or damage as a result of a violation of the Convention. 
 
3. The Conference affirms that, should a request for assistance be made, it 
should be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided.  In this 
context, pending consideration of a decision by the United Nations Security Council, 
timely emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties or appropriate 
international organizations, if requested.  The Conference takes note of the proposal 
that States Parties might need to coordinate procedures for assistance in order to 
ensure that timely emergency assistance could be provided if requested. 
 
4. The Conference invites each State Party in a position to do so to identify 
possible types of medical, veterinary, or other assistance that might be made 
available.  The Conference urges States Parties to commit, to the extent that they are 
able, to provide, or contribute to, the training and operation of national and/or 
international rapid response teams for emergency medical assistance, as well as 
necessary materials and equipment, especially for detection. 
 
5. The Conference expresses concern at the possibility of biological weapons use 
or threat of use.  The Conference underlines the value of promoting, as appropriate, 
access to medicines, medical prophylaxis and treatment as a crucial condition in the 
combat of outbreaks of diseases resulting from a violation of the Convention. 
 
6. The Conference considers that in the event this Article might be invoked, the 
United Nations, with the help of appropriate intergovernmental organizations such as 
the World Health Organization (WHO), Office International des Epizooties (OIE) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), could play a coordinating role in 
providing assistance. 
 
43.  The first paragraph is identical to and the second, third and sixth paragraphs are 
developed from those in the 1996 Final Declaration.  These developments are welcomed as 
they have in general strengthened the language and have usefully extended the 
understandings.  The development in the sixth paragraph to include mention of the OIE and 
FAO as well as the WHO is particularly welcomed as this was proposed20 in the Key Points.   
The fourth and fifth paragraphs are new: the fourth invites States Parties to identify possible 
types of assistance and to contribute to the training of national and/or international rapid 
response teams for emergency medical assistance and the fifth underlines the importance of 
                                                 
20See page 77, paragraph 5 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening 
the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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promoting access to medicines, medical prophylaxis and treatment in countering outbreaks of 
disease resulting from a violation of the Convention.  We recommend no amendments to the 
Article VII section of the draft Final Declaration. 
 
Article VIII 
 
44.  The draft Article VIII section consists of seven paragraphs which are all agreed.  This is 
the same number of paragraphs as in the Article VIII section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  
The draft Article VIII section states that: 
 
1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VIII and stresses the 
significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological methods of Warfare, signed at 
Geneva on 17 June 1925. 
 
2. The Conference acknowledges that the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by prohibiting 
the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, forms an essential complement to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. 
 
3. The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction shall be interpreted as in 
any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 
 
4. Noting the actions in support of the Protocol taken by the Security Council 
and General Assembly of the United Nations, and recalling the solemn reaffirmation 
of the prohibition as established in the Protocol, issued by the Conference of States 
parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested States held in Paris from 7 
to 11 January 1989, the Conference appeals to all States Parties to the Geneva 
Protocol to fulfil their obligations assumed under that Protocol and urges all states 
parties not yet parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to accede to it without delay. 
 
5. The Conference stresses the importance of the withdrawal of all reservations 
to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention. 
 
6. The Conference welcomes the actions which States Parties have taken to 
withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons convention, and calls upon those States Parties that continue to 
maintain pertinent reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw those 
reservations, and notify the Depositary of the Protocol of their withdrawals without 
delay. 
 
7. The Conference notes that reservations concerning retaliation, implying the 
possible use of any of the objects prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, even if conditional, are totally incompatible with the absolute and 
universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and 
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retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, with the aim to exclude 
completely and forever the possibility of their use. 
 
45.  The first, fifth and seventh paragraphs are identical to and the second, third, fourth and 
sixth paragraphs are slightly amended from the language in the Article VIII section of the 
1996 Final Declaration.  The second and third paragraphs are amended by using the formal 
title of the Convention -- "the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction" 
--  in place of the shorter title "the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" used in the 
1996 Final Declaration.  The fourth paragraph is amended by deletion of the clause in the 
1996 Final Declaration which had referred to the particular UN Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions.  We recommend that the typographical errors which have found their 
way into the third, fourth and sixth paragraphs of the Article VIII section of the draft Final 
Declaration be corrected as follows: in the fifth line of the third paragraph correct to read 
"Poisonous"; in the fourth line of the fourth paragraph correct to read "Parties" and in the 
sixth and seventh lines correct to "States Parties"; and in the third line of the sixth paragraph 
correct to read "Convention".   We also recommend that the draft Final Declaration be 
reviewed throughout to remove any other such typographical errors. 
 
46.  The sixth paragraph has been slightly simplified by the omission of the words "1925 
Geneva" which had preceded "Protocol" in the last line in the 1996 Final Declaration.  In Key 
Points, we proposed that the sixth paragraph should be extended by an added sentence to 
enable the proposed continuing representative body (Committee of Oversight) to follow up 
the "calls on" request.  We recommend that the sixth paragraph be extended by the following 
additional sentence: "The Conference authorises its [Committee of Oversight] to follow up 
this request from the Conference by undertaking demarches as appropriate to those States 
Parties that continue to maintain pertinent reservations."  
 
 
Article IX 
 
47.  The draft Article IX section consists of four paragraphs of which three are agreed and one 
-- paragraph 3 -- is yet to be agreed.  This is one paragraph less than in the Article IX section 
of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article IX section states that: 
 
1. The Conference reaffirms that Article IX identifies the recognised objective of 
the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.  The Conference welcomes the entry-
into-force on April 29, 1997 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
thus fulfilling the provisions of this Article. 
 
2. The Conference also welcomes the fact that 143 countries have become States 
Parties to the Convention and some others have declared their intention to adhere to 
the Convention.  It strongly urges all those that have not yet ratified or acceded to do 
so, in order to achieve the early universalization of the Convention and a world free 
of chemical weapons.  In this connection, the Conference urges all States Parties to 
persuade non-Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to ratify or accede to the 
Convention to realise its universality. 
 
3. The Conference also underlines the importance of effective and full 
implementation of the Convention in all its aspects. 
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4. The Conference takes note that the First Review Conference of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention will take place in 2003, and affirms the complementarity 
between the objectives of the two Conventions. 
 
48.  The first paragraph is identical to that in the 1996 Final Declaration.  The second and 
fourth paragraphs that are agreed are both new.  The second paragraph welcomes the fact that 
143 countries have become States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
strongly urges all those that have not ratified or acceded to do so.  The fourth paragraph takes 
note that the First Review Conference of the CWC will take place in 2003 and usefully 
"affirms the complementarity between the objectives of the two Conventions."  The third 
paragraph, yet to be agreed, states that "3.  The Conference also underlines the importance of 
effective and full implementation of the Convention in all its aspects."  As Article IX of the 
BTWC gives the BTWC States Parties a special standing and continuing responsibility in 
relation to the CWC, language that emphasizes the importance of effective and full 
implementation of that Convention is appropriate and necessary. We recommend that the 
third paragraph be agreed. 
 
Article X 
 
49.  The draft Article X section consists of twenty-two paragraphs of which nineteen are 
agreed,  one -- paragraph 6 (c) -- is agreed apart from one phrase and two -- paragraphs 5 and 
20 -- are yet to be agreed.  This is five paragraphs more than in the Article X section of the 
1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article X section states that: 
 
1. The Conference once more emphasizes the increasing importance of the 
provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological 
developments - including innovative research on genome sequencing like the human 
genome project - in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and 
toxins with peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for 
cooperation between States to help promote economic and social development, and 
scientific and technological progress, particularly in developing countries with a 
specific focus on least developed countries, in conformity with their interests, needs 
and priorities. 
 
2. The Conference notes that, since the Fourth Review Conference, States Parties 
- both bilaterally and multilaterally, including through specialized International 
Organizations such as WHO, UNDP, FAO, OIE and ICGEB and other relevant 
organisations - have increased their contributions to facilitate international 
cooperation in the field of biotechnology, which focused on, inter alia: 
 
(a) Research activities aimed at improving the capabilities of States 
Parties to monitor emerging and re-emerging diseases and to treat them; 
 
(b) International cooperation on disease outbreaks; 
 
(c) International cooperation on vaccine research and production and on 
global vaccination programs; 
 
(d) Technology transfers; 
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(e) Training of national experts from developing countries on 
microbiology, molecular biology, immunology and pathology, plant biology, 
protein structure and function, virology, industrial biotechnology; 
 
(f) Research activities on genome dynamics; 
 
(g) Establishment of biological data bases; 
 
(h) Publication, exchange and dissemination of relevant information. 
 
3. The Conference, while acknowledging what has already been done towards 
this end, notes with concern the gap still existing between the developed and 
developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology 
and other related areas.  The Conference urges all States Parties to actively continue 
to promote international cooperation and exchange with States Parties in the peaceful 
uses of biotechnology, and urges all States Parties possessing advanced 
biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and 
international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular 
with developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind. At the same time, the 
Conference stresses that measures to implement Article X need to be consistent with 
the objectives and provisions of the Convention. 
 
4. The Conference welcomes the information provided by a number of States 
Parties on the cooperative measures they have undertaken towards fulfilling their 
Article X obligations and encourages other States Parties in a position to do so to 
provide such information. 
 
5. The Conference underlines the importance, in the context of Article X 
implementation, of the Convention on Biological Diversity and of the Rio 
Declaration and the Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro Brazil, 1992. 
 
5 bis (previously paragraph 20)  The Conference underlines the importance, in the 
context of Article X implementation, of the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
of the Rio Declaration and the Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. 
The Conference welcomes the adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity in 2001 and looks forward to further steps 
being taken during the World Summit on Sustainable Development, to be held in 
Johannesburg, in 2002. 
 
6. The Conference urges States Parties to continue to implement specific 
measures designed to enhance compliance with and ensure effective and full 
implementation of Article X of the Convention among the States Parties. The 
implementation of such measures shall, inter alia, be aimed at: 
 
(a) Promoting scientific and technological exchanges and fostering 
international co-operation, as appropriate, on a multilateral, regional or 
bilateral basis in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
activities; 
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(b) Facilitating free trade and the fullest possible exchange in biological 
agents, toxins, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes in order to 
enhance the economic and technological development of States Parties, and 
ensuring the right of States Parties to participate in such exchanges to the 
fullest extent possible; 
 
(c) Avoiding hampering the economic and technological development of 
States Parties through any restrictions incompatible with the obligations 
undertaken under the Convention or limitations on the transfer, for purposes 
consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, of 
scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials. 
 
7. The Conference recalls that the States Parties have a legal obligation to 
facilitate, and have the right to participate, in the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of 
bacteriological (biological) agents, and toxins for peaceful purposes and not to 
hamper the economic and technological development of States Parties. 
 
8. The Conference reiterated the confirmation of the Forth Review Conference 
that the provisions of Article III should not be used to impose restrictions and/or 
limitations on the transfers for purposes consistent with the objectives and the 
purposes of the Convention, of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and 
materials under Article X. 
 
9. The Conference urges States Parties to undertake or continue to promote and 
support the following activities, in furtherance of any current endeavors relevant to 
and in accordance with the Convention, where appropriate, individually, jointly, 
through arrangements with relevant international organizations including, but not 
limited to, the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Center for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, International Vaccine Institute, Office International 
des Epizooties, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, United 
Nations Environment Program, United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
or World Health Organization and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: 
 
(a) The publication, exchange and dissemination of information on 
research and development on the peaceful uses of microbial or other 
biological agents and toxins, on bio-safety, prophylactics and protection, 
biotechnology, Good Laboratory Practice and current Good Manufacturing 
Practice, and diagnosis, surveillance, detection, treatment and prevention of 
diseases caused by microbial or other biological agents and toxins; 
 
(b) The improvement and development, as appropriate, of research 
capabilities, including research institutes, in relevant fields of biosciences and 
biotechnology for peaceful purposes, through collaborative research 
programs and projects, upon the specific request of, and in co-operation with, 
the State Party concerned, in particular in the use of micro-organisms and 
other biological agents and toxins for medical, agricultural, veterinary and 
industrial purposes; 
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(c) International cooperation on the research, development and 
production of vaccines; 
 
(d) Transfer and exchange of information concerning research programs 
in biosciences and greater cooperation in international public health and 
disease control; 
 
(e) Technological exchange of information among States Parties of 
technology for the peaceful uses of genetic engineering, the prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment of diseases caused by microbial and other biological 
agents or toxins, in particular infectious diseases, and for other relevant fields 
of biosciences and biotechnology for peaceful purposes; 
 
(f) Participation on a fair and equitable basis and as wide a geographic 
basis as possible at the bilateral, regional or multilateral levels in the 
application of biotechnology and scientific research and development, for the 
prevention, surveillance, detection, diagnosis and treatment of diseases 
caused by microbial and other biological agents or toxins, in particular 
infectious diseases; 
 
(g) The establishment or continuation of a framework for cooperation 
aimed at improving and strengthening the capabilities of States Parties 
through research activities in the field of prophylaxis and protection against 
diseases caused by microbial and other biological agents or toxins, in 
particular infectious diseases; 
 
(h) Transfer and exchange of information concerning research 
programmes in biosciences and greater cooperation in international public 
health and disease control; 
 
(i) Increased technical cooperation and assistance including training 
programmes, workshops and scientific conferences for health workers and 
experts in developing countries through interaction with relevant international 
organizations such as WHO, FAO and OIE; 
 
(j) Cooperation in providing information on epidemiological and 
epizootical study of diseases and data reporting systems on bilateral, regional 
and international levels in conjunction with relevant United Nations agencies 
within their competencies with a view to improve identification and timely 
reporting of outbreak of human, animal and plant diseases; 
 
(k) Promotion of exchange of scientists and experts to enhance the 
capability of States Parties in strengthening their disease surveillance 
programmes; 
 
(l) Increased coordination, operation and updating of existing databases 
on infectious diseases in States Parties as well as easy access to such 
databases by all States Parties; 
 
(m) Strengthening the existing global networks for disease surveillance 
and building up their capabilities to respond to disease outbreaks in a timely 
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fashion particularly in humanitarian assistance to the States Parties affected 
by disease outbreaks, utilizing relevant international organizations and 
agencies including WHO, and its global outbreak alert and response network 
launched in 2000 as well as its centre on communicable diseases surveillance 
and response established in Lyon in 2000, with the participation of relevant 
institutions of the States Parties; 
 
(n) Assisting the States Parties through relevant international bodies 
within their competencies to strengthen national and local programmes of 
surveillance for infectious diseases an improving early notification, 
surveillance, control, protection and response capabilities. 
 
10. The Conference invites WHO, FAO and OIE to enhance their coordination 
efforts on epidemiological surveillance and disease prevention by making use of 
existing international efforts for enhancing a system of global cooperation for 
surveillance of infectious diseases. 
 
11. The Conference urges the use of existing institutional means within the United 
Nations system and the full utilization of the possibilities provided by the specialized 
agencies and other international organizations, and considers that the 
implementation of Article X could be enhanced through greater coordination among 
international cooperation programs in the biological field for peaceful purposes 
conducted by States Parties, specialized agencies and other international 
organizations. 
 
12. The Conference reiterates its call upon the Secretary-General of the United 
nations to propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body, 
before the next Review Conference, a discussion and examination of the means of 
improving institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the 
use of Bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. 
 
13. The Conference welcomes to elaborate an international programme of vaccine 
development for the prevention of diseases which would involve the scientific and 
technical personnel from developing countries that are States Parties to the 
Convention.  The Conference recognizes that such a program will not only enhance 
peaceful international cooperation in biotechnology but also contribute to improve 
health care in developing countries, assist in establishing systems for surveillance of 
communicable diseases, and provide transparency in accordance with the 
Convention. 
 
14. The Conference, recognizing progress already achieved in this field, calls 
upon all States in a position to do so to enhance cooperation in promotion and 
financing the establishment of vaccine and prophylactic agents production facilities. 
The Conference recommends further that relevant multilateral organizations and 
world financial institutions continue to provide assistance for establishment and 
promotion of vaccine and prophylactic agents production projects in these countries. 
 
15. The Conference welcomes the establishment, in 1997, of the International 
Vaccine Institute, an international institution devoted to strengthening the capacity of 
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developing countries in vaccine development, production and use in immunization 
programs. 
 
16. The Conference calls upon States Parties to explore ways of implementing at a 
global level Good laboratory Practices, including audit trails for the transfer of 
pathogens and toxins between, and within, laboratories, taking into account the views 
of the WHO, the OIE, the FAO, the ICGEB and other relevant organizations as 
appropriate. 
 
17. The Conference considers that enhanced synergy among existing national and 
international data banks would facilitate the flow of information in the field of genetic 
engineering, biotechnology and other scientific developments. In this context, the 
Conference underlines the importance of monitoring all related developments in the 
field of frontiers science and high technology in the areas relevant to the Convention. 
 
18. The Conference notes that existing institutional ways and means of ensuring 
cooperation between States Parties would profit from continued development in order 
to promote international cooperation in peaceful activities in areas such as medicine, 
public health and agriculture as well as related advanced fields of biotechnology. 
 
19. The Conference proposes that States Parties consult bilaterally and/or 
multilaterally as appropriate on the creation of opportunities for cooperation on 
matters relevant to scientific and technological exchanges for peaceful purposes 
related to the implementation of the Convention. 
 
20. The Conference calls for the establishment of a forum for consultation and 
creation of opportunities for cooperation on matters related to the promotion of 
scientific and technological exchange in the field of peaceful, bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin activities, and review of the implementation of Article X of 
the Convention among the States Parties to the Protocol. 
 
21. The Conference urges the States Parties, the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies to take appropriate measures within their competence for the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological 
information and to promote technology transfer among themselves in particular to 
developing countries for surveillance and control of disease caused by biological 
agents and toxins in humans, animals and plants.  Such measures should include, 
inter alia; 
 
(a) Exchange of information concerning research programmes in 
biosciences and close cooperation in international public health and control 
of infectious diseases; 
 
(b) Increased technical cooperation and assistance including training 
programmes, workshops and scientific conferences for health workers and 
experts in developing countries through interaction with relevant international 
organizations such as WHO, FAO and OIE; 
 
(c) Cooperation in providing information on epidemiological and 
epizootological study of infectious diseases and data reporting systems on 
bilateral, regional and international levels in conjunction with relevant United 
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Nations agencies with a view to improve identification and timely reporting of 
outbreak of human, animal and plant diseases; 
 
(d) Promotion of exchange of scientists and experts to enhance the 
capability of States Parties in promoting their disease surveillance 
programmes; 
 
(e) Increased coordination, operation and updating of existing databases 
on infectious diseases in States Parties as well as easy access to such 
databases by all States Parties; 
 
(f) Implementation of a coordinating mechanism by the WHO, the FAO 
and OIE for epidemiological surveillance and disease prevention by making 
use of existing international effort for enhancing a system of global 
cooperation for surveillance of infectious diseases; 
 
(g) Strengthening the existing global networks for disease surveillance 
and building up their capabilities to respond to disease outbreaks in a timely 
fashion particularly in humanitarian assistance to the States Parties affected 
by disease outbreaks, utilizing relevant international organizations and 
agencies including WHO, with the participation of relevant institutions of the 
States Parties; 
 
(h) Assisting the States Parties to strengthen national and local 
programmes of surveillance for infectious diseases an improving early 
notification, surveillance, control, protection and response capabilities. 
 
22. The Conference considers that the WHO has made valuable contributions in 
the area of humanitarian assistance in cases of outbreak of diseases and recognises 
the WHO’s mandate for global health, epidemiological alert and response to 
outbreaks of human disease. 
 
50.   The first, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, seventeenth, 
eighteenth paragraphs are identical to or developed from the corresponding paragraphs in the 
1996 Final Declaration.  The second, ninth, tenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, nineteenth 
and twenty-second paragraphs that are agreed are new as is the sixth paragraph, which is 
agreed apart from a clause in. paragraph 6 (c).  Some of the new paragraphs, frequently with 
several subparagraphs, have largely been taken from language in Article 14 of the Chairman's 
composite text21.  We recommend that the typographical error in paragraph 8 be corrected so 
as to read "Fourth", that in the last line of paragraph 12 be corrected to read "bacteriological" 
and those in the second line of paragraph 16 be corrected to "Laboratory Practice".  In 
addition, we recommend that the missing words "efforts to" be inserted in the first line of 
paragraph 13 after "The Conference" thereby restoring the language to that in the 1996 Final 
Declaration. 
 
                                                 
21United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/56-1 and 56-2, 18 May 2001, Geneva. Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc and at http://www.opbw.org 
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51.  Paragraph 6 of the draft Final Declaration lifts language from paragraph 1 of the General 
Provisions of Article 14 addressing technical cooperation in the Chairman's composite text of 
the Protocol with a slightly modified chapeau stating that: 
 
6.  The Conference urges States Parties to continue to implement specific measures 
designed to enhance compliance with and ensure effective and full implementation of 
Article X of the Convention among States Parties.  The implementation of such 
measures shall, inter alia, be aimed at: [underlined language is identical to that in 
paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Chairman's composite text] 
 
This is then followed by three subparagraphs that are essentially identical to the three 
subparagraphs of paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Chairman's composite text.  It is in 
paragraph 6 (c) that the phrase yet to be agreed "or limitations on the transfer" sits: 
 
(c) Avoiding hampering the economic and technological development of States 
Parties through any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under 
the Convention or limitations on the transfer, for purposes consistent with the 
objectives and the provisions of the Convention, of scientific knowledge, technology, 
equipment and materials. 
 
This is language identical to that in the Chairman's composite text and may be compared with 
the language in the corresponding paragraph 1 (c) of the rolling text22 which states: 
 
(c) Avoiding hampering the economic and technological development of States 
Parties [or] [imposing and maintaining] [through] any restrictions incompatible 
with the obligations undertaken under the Convention and/or limitations on the 
transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the 
Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials. 
 
The diagreement in the rolling text was thus not about the clause "or limitations on the 
transfer," but about the lead in to the clause which had been addressed in the Chairman's 
composite text.  We recommend that the clause "or limitations on the transfer," in paragraph 
6 (c) be agreed. 
 
52.  Paragraph 9 of the draft Declaration contains language from paragraph 4 of Article 14 of 
the Chairman's composite text of the Protocol with a different chapeau stating that: 
 
9.  The Conference urges States Parties to undertake or continue to promote and 
support the following activities, in furtherance of any current endeavors relevant to 
and in accordance with the Convention, where appropriate, individually, jointly, 
through arrangements with relevant international organizations including, but not 
limited to, the Food and agriculture Organization, International Center for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, International Vaccine Institute, Office International 
des Epizooties, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, United 
nations Environment Program, United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
or World Health Organization and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
                                                 
22United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/56-1 and 56-2, 18 May 2001, Geneva. Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc and at http://www.opbw.org 
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Diversity:   [underlined language is identical to that in paragraph 4 of Article 14 of the 
Chairman's composite text] 
 
This is then followed by subparagraphs (a) to (n) which largely reflect the subparagraphs (a) 
to (k) of paragraph 4 of Article 14 of the Chairman's composite text as well as include new 
subparagraphs. 
 
53.  Two paragraphs are not yet agreed.  Paragraph 5 proposes two alternatives dealing with 
references to the Convention on Biological Diversity; the second alternative includes an 
additional sentence making reference to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: 
 
5.  The Conference underlines the importance, in the context of Article X 
implementation,  of the Convention on Biological Diversity and of the Rio 
Declaration and the Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. 
 
5 bis  The Conference underlines the importance, in the context of Article X 
implementation,  of the Convention on Biological Diversity and of the Rio 
Declaration and the Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992.  The Conference 
welcomes the adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 2001 and looks forward to further steps being taken during the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, to be held in Johannesburg, in 2002. 
 
The first alternative is simply a rephrased version and substantively identical to paragraph 9 
in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference which read as follows: 
 
9. The Conference takes note of the significant steps forward in promoting 
cooperation in the biological field taken by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, including the 
adoption of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, and by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and underlines their importance in the context of Article X implementation. 
 
The second alternative simply updates the same substantive points.  As we have argued 
previously that the Article X developments need to be considered in the light of developments 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, we 
recommend that the second alternative be agreed, updated as appropriate to take into account 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in South Africa earlier this year. 
 
54.  The other paragraph (20) which is not yet agreed relates to the establishment of a forum 
for the consultation on cooperation -- essentially a Cooperation Committee similar to that in 
the Chairman's composite text -- on which the proposed language is clearly taken, without 
even amendment to remove the inappropriate reference to the Protocol, from paragraph 2 of 
the Chairman's composite text and reads as follows: 
 
20.  The Conference calls for the establishment of a forum for consultation and 
creation of opportunities for cooperation on matters related to the promotion of 
scientific and technological exchange in the field of peaceful, bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin activities, and review of the implementation of Article X of the 
Convention among the States Parties to the Protocol. [underlined language is 
identical to that in paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Chairman's composite text] 
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As in the Key Points we have proposed23 in the Article XII section that an interim supportive 
institution should be set up to nurture and sustain the Convention between Review 
Conferences and that that institution should be able to establish, as necessary, for the exercise 
of its functions subsidiary organs such as a Legal Advisory Panel or Scientific Advisory 
Panel, we recommend that language be agreed in the Article X section of the Final 
Declaration for a Cooperation Advisory Panel as a subsidiary organ to the interim supportive 
institution as follows, with new language shown in bold: 
 
20. The Conference calls for the establishment of a forum for consultation and 
creation of opportunities for cooperation on matters related to the promotion of 
scientific and technological exchange in the field of peaceful, bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin activities, and review of the implementation of Article X of the 
Convention as a subsidiary organ to the Oversight Committee established under 
Article XII. 
 
Article XI 
 
55.  The draft Article XI section consists of one paragraph which is agreed. This is three 
paragraphs less than in the Article XI section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article 
XI section states that: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of Article XI.  In this context the Conference 
underlines that the provisions of Article XI should in principle be implemented in such 
a way as not to affect the universality of the Convention. 
 
56.  This paragraph has been developed from the corresponding single paragraph in the 
Article XI section of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference which stated that: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of Article XI and that since the entry into force 
of the Convention the provisions of the Article have not been invoked.  In this context 
the Conference underlines that the provisions of Article XI should in principle be 
implemented in such a way as not to affect the universality of the Convention. 
 
The substance of this paragraph, abbreviated to take account of the invocation of Article XI 
by one State Party in 1996, which was the subject of three new paragraphs in the 1996 Final 
Declaration, was included as the fourth paragraph in the 1996 Final Declaration which stated 
that: 
 
4. The Conference meanwhile reaffirms the importance of Article XI. In this context 
the Conference underlines that the provisions of Article XI should in principle be 
implemented in such a way as not to affect the universality of the Convention.   
 
                                                 
23See pages 122 to 129,  paragraphs 12 to 31 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims 
(eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc 
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The Key Points proposed24 a single paragraph using similar language to that in the fourth 
paragraph of the Article XI section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  We, consequently, 
recommend no changes to the Article XI section of the draft Final Declaration. 
 
Article XII 
 
57.  The draft Article XII section consists of three paragraphs of which one -- paragraph 1 --  
is agreed. This is the same number as in the Article XII section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  
The draft Article XII section states that: 
 
1. The Conference decides that a Sixth Review Conference shall be held in 
Geneva at the request of the majority of States Parties, or in any case, not later than 
2006. 
 
2. The Conference decides that the Sixth Review Conference shall consider, 
inter alia: 
 
- … 
 
- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to 
the Convention; 
 
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention on the effective implementation of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, duly taking into account the 
degree of universality attained by such conventions at the time of the Fifth 
Review Conference; 
 
- The effectiveness of confidence-building measures as agreed at the 
Second and Third Review Conferences; 
 
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation 
by the United Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other 
requirements to assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions 
of the Fourth Review Conference; 
 
3. The Review Conference reaffirms that conferences of States Parties to 
review the operation of the Convention should be held at least every five years. 
 
58.  It is the Article XII section of the Final Declaration on which the new language proposed 
by the United States on 7 December 2001 in the final hours of the initial session of the Fifth 
Review Conference led to the adjournment of the Review Conference until 11 November 
2002.    The first paragraph, which is agreed, and the third paragraph, which is not agreed, are 
essentially identical to the corresponding paragraphs of the 1996 Final Declaration:  the first 
paragraph having "Fifth" in place of "Fourth" and "2006" in place of "2001" and the third 
                                                 
24See page 117, paragraph 7 Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening 
the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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paragraph having "reaffirms" in place of "recommends."   As proposed25 in the Key Points, 
we recommend that the third paragraph should move from recommendation to decision and 
that it should consequently read as follows "3.  The Review Conference decides that 
conferences of States Parties to review the operation of the Convention should be held at 
least every five years." with the new language in bold. 
 
59.  The second paragraph is the paragraph that sets out the agenda items to be included at the 
Sixth Review Conference.   The 1996 Final Declaration included the following as its second 
paragraph: 
 
2. The Conference decides that the Fifth Review Conference shall consider, inter 
alia,  
 
- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to the 
Convention; 
 
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention on the effective implementation of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, duly taking into account the degree of 
universality attained by such conventions at the time of the Fifth Review 
Conference; 
 
- The effectiveness of confidence-building measures as agreed at the Second 
and Third Review Conferences; 
 
- The conclusions of a Special Conference, to which the Ad Hoc Group shall 
submit its report, including a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which shall be adopted by 
consensus, to be held as soon as possible before the commencement of the 
Fifth Review Conference; and further action as appropriate; 
 
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation by the 
United Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other requirements to 
assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Fourth 
Review Conference; 
 
60.  The first three and the fifth subparagraphs are essentially non-contentious and should be 
updated as appropriate -- notably the second sub-paragraph needs to refer to "the degree of 
universality attained by such conventions at the time of the Sixth Review Conference" and 
not as in the draft Final Declaration to "the time of the Fifth Review Conference".  We 
recommend that the first two subparagraphs be agreed as follows where the new language is 
shown in bold: 
 
- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to the Convention; 
 
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the effective implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
                                                 
25See page 122, paragraph 11 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
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Convention, duly taking into account the degree of universality attained by such 
conventions at the time of the Sixth Review Conference; 
 
We recommend that the third subparagraph be extended as indicated in bold below so as to 
include developments to the confidence-building measures agreed by the ad-hoc meeting 
recommended above for the Article V section of the Final Declaration:  
 
- The effectiveness of confidence-building measures as agreed at the Second and 
Third Review Conferences and at the ad-hoc meeting following this Review 
Conference; 
 
The fifth sub-paragraph in the draft Final Declaration refers to "the effective implementation 
of the relevant decisions of the Fourth Review Conference" when it is  clearly intended to 
refer to the relevant decisions of the Fifth Review Conference.  However,  in the Key Points 
we proposed26 that because there are outstanding requests from the earlier Review 
Conferences, the language should be amended to refer to "the relevant decisions of this and 
previous Review Conferences". Consequently, we recommend that the fifth subparagraph be 
extended as follows, with new language in bold:  
 
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation by the 
United Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other requirements to assist 
the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of this and previous Review 
Conferences; 
 
61.  The fourth sub-paragraph is more difficult.  In the Key Points, we proposed27 language as 
follows: 
 
-  The conclusions of a Special Conference, if held before the Sixth Review 
Conference for the purpose of receiving the report of the Ad Hoc Group, including a 
legally-binding instrument to strengthen the Convention, which shall have been 
adopted by consensus.  The inclusion of this agenda item is without prejudice to the 
positions of States Parties on [the future work of the Ad Hoc Group and on] matters 
under negotiation in the Ad Hoc Group; 
 
In the light of the proposal by one State Party to terminate the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, 
we recommend that an alternative wording might be preferable which avoids explicit 
mention of the Ad Hoc Group: 
 
-  The conclusions of a Special Conference, if held before the Sixth Review 
Conference for the purpose of receiving a report, including a legally-binding 
instrument to strengthen the Convention.  The inclusion of this agenda item is without 
prejudice to the positions of States Parties on  matters under negotiation; 
 
                                                 
26See page 121, paragraph 7 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  
27See page 121, paragraph 8 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
 
42 
62.  In the Key Points, we recognized28 that there is a compelling argument for the 
Conference to establish an interim supportive institution or bureau to undertake continuing 
tasks between the Fifth and Sixth Review Conferences and proposed language for the Article 
XII section to achieve this.  This language took the form of an additional subparagraph for the 
second paragraph as follows: 
 
-  The report of the General Committee of the Fifth Review Conference, or other 
continuing representative body, constituted as a [Committee of Oversight] under 
paragraph 4 below, including any recommendation that its mandate be extended, with 
or without amendment, to bridge the interval between the Sixth and Seventh Review 
Conferences. 
 
together with an additional five new paragraphs: 
 
4. The Conference, conscious of the need for interim institutions in support of the 
Convention to bridge the five years' interval between the Fifth and Sixth Review 
Conferences, and without prejudice to the positions of States Parties on the 
strengthening of the Convention through a legally-binding instrument, requests its 
General Committee [to constitute itself as a continuing body until the Sixth Review 
Conference] [to elect x of its members to constitute a continuing body until the Sixth 
Review Conference] under the name [Committee of Oversight] [Continuing 
Committee] [Interim Committee] [Representative Committee] and in that capacity, 
under the authority of this Conference and without detracting from the functions of 
the Depositary Governments designated under Article XIV: 
 
(a) to follow up the Final Declaration and decisions of this Conference; 
 
(b) to exercise a general oversight over the effective application of the 
provisions of, and the balanced operation of, the Convention, including its 
programme of confidence-building measures established by the Second and 
Third Review Conferences, in the interests of the States Parties as a 
collectivity; 
 
(c) to assist States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Convention 
and their politically binding commitments, including the programme of 
confidence-building measures, under the Final Declarations of successive 
Review Conferences; 
 
(d) to promote universal adherence to the Convention, including the 
organisation of demarches on its behalf to States Signatories which have yet 
to ratify their signatures, to encourage their ratification, and to non-
signatories, to encourage their accession to the Convention; 
 
(e) to represent the States Parties to the Convention as a collectivity in 
relations with the United Nations, and with other organizations as 
appropriate; 
                                                 
28See pages 122 to 129,  paragraphs 12 to 31 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims 
(eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc 
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(f) to establish, as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions, 
subsidiary organs such as a Legal Advisory Panel and a Scientific Advisory 
Panel with appropriate terms of reference; 
 
(g) to establish, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, a small secretariat dedicated exclusively to the service of the 
Convention including this Committee and its Panels; 
 
(h) to report to the Sixth Review Conference, including a recommendation on 
whether this mandate should be extended, with or without amendment, under 
the authority of the Sixth Review Conference to bridge the interval between the 
Sixth and Seventh Review Conferences. 
 
5.  The Committee shall meet no less often than once a year between the Fifth and 
Sixth Review Conferences. 
 
6.  The Committee shall operate by consensus. 
 
7. The Committee may be invited by any State Party to assist in undertaking 
consultation and cooperation pursuant to Article V, and may accede to such an 
invitation provided no State Party objects, without detracting from the right of any 
State Party to request that a Formal Consultative Meeting be convened in accordance 
with the decisions of successive Review Conferences and the procedures agreed by 
them, under Article V, or to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security 
Council under Article VI. 
 
8.  The Committee shall issue interim reports on its work, in addition to the report to 
the Sixth Review Conference required under paragraph 1(h) above.  Such reports 
shall be addressed to all States Parties and shall also be made available to States 
Signatories, the United Nations, and other organizations as appropriate; 
 
9.  The Committee shall be financed pro rata as an appendix of this Fifth Review 
Conference. 
 
63.  In the Key Points, we recommended that the Article XII section of the Final Declaration 
of the Fifth Review Conference be extended to include the above additional subparagraph to 
the second paragraph and the new paragraphs four to nine.  Since then proposals have been 
made by States Parties for other mechanisms to bridge the gap between the Error! 
 
64.  We recommend that the Article XII section be extended to make provision at least for: 
 
- prolongation to 2006 of the General Committee of the Fifth Review Conference, or a 
smaller committee elected from its membership, constituted as a continuing 
representative body or bureau; 
 
- authorisation for this continuing representative body or bureau to establish, as it 
finds necessary, subsidiary organs such as a Scientific Advisory Panel, a Legal 
Advisory Panel and in relation to Article X a Cooperation Advisory Panel; 
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- establishment, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of a 
small secretariat dedicated exclusively to the service of the Convention; 
 
- financing of these mechanisms, and of any follow-up meetings of States Parties as 
an appendix of the Fifth Review Conference; 
 
together with such annual meetings of States Parties and ad hoc meetings as also may be 
agreed. 
 
65.  These provisions should be included in further paragraphs drawing as appropriate on the 
detailed mandate recommended in Key Points and reproduced above in paragraph 62.  We 
continue to recommend the title "Commitee of Oversight". 
 
Article XIII 
 
66.  The draft Article XIII section consists of one paragraph which is agreed. This is the same 
number as in the Article XIII section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article XIII 
section states that: 
 
The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and emphasises that the 
Convention is of unlimited duration and applies at all times. 
 
67.  This paragraph is a curtailed version of the single paragraph in the 1996 Final 
Declaration which stated that: 
 
1. The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and, while emphasizing that the 
Convention is of unlimited duration and applies at all times, expresses its satisfaction 
that no State Party to the Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the 
Convention. 
 
There is no advantage from the curtailment so, consequently, we recommend the addition of 
the omitted words so that the Article XIII section reads as follows, with the added wording in 
bold: 
 
The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and, while emphasizing that the 
Convention is of unlimited duration and applies at all times, expresses its satisfaction 
that no State Party to the Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the 
Convention. 
 
Article XIV 
 
68.  The draft Article XIV section consists of two paragraphs which are agreed. This is three 
paragraphs less than in the Article XIV section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft 
Article XIV section states that: 
 
1. The Conference notes that eight States have ratified or acceded to the 
Convention since the Fourth Review Conference. 
 
2. The Conference calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the 
Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of universal 
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adherence to the Convention.  In this connection, the Conference requests States 
Parties to encourage universality of the Convention. 
 
69.  The first paragraph is similar to the first paragraph in the 1996 Final Declaration which 
stated that: 
 
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that a number of States have acceded to the 
Convention since the Third Review Conference. 
 
Since the initial session of the Fifth Review Conference, a further State has become a State 
Party to the Convention so the number needs to be increased from "eight" to "nine". There is 
no advantage from the omission of the words "with satisfaction" as this omission appears to 
suggest that the States Parties are indifferent to the increased number of States Parties.  We 
recommend that the first paragraph be amended as follows with new language in bold: 
 
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that nine States have ratified or 
acceded to the Convention since the Fourth Review Conference. 
 
70.  The second paragraph has elided into a single paragraph the second and third paragraphs 
in the 1996 Final Declaration which stated that: 
 
2. The Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the 
Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the 
Convention to join the States Parties thereto, thus contributing to the achievement of 
universal adherence to the Convention. 
 
3. In this connection, the Conference requests States Parties to encourage wider 
adherence to the Convention. 
 
The omission of the specific language calling upon "those States which have not signed the 
Convention to join the States Parties thereto" adds no advantage and we recommend that 
these omitted words be added so as to make explicit the call to those States which have not 
signed the Convention as such States are not committed, as Signatory States are, to doing 
nothing contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.  The paragraph should 
therefore read as follows, with new language in bold: 
 
2. The Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the 
Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the 
Convention to join the States Parties thereto, thus contributing to the achievement of 
universal adherence to the Convention.  In this connection, the Conference requests 
States Parties to encourage universality of the Convention. 
 
71.  The draft Final Declaration has omitted comparable language to that included in the 
fourth and fifth paragraphs of the 1996 Final Declaration that state: 
 
4. The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to wider 
accession to the Convention.  
 
5. The Fourth Review Conference appeals to those States Parties to the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention which have taken part in the Conference to 
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participate in the implementation of provisions contained in the Final Declaration of 
this Conference. The Conference also appeals to all States Parties to participate 
actively in the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties, with a view to the early completion of 
its work to strengthen the Convention. 
 
There is no advantage from omitting the fourth paragraph, especially at a time when regional 
groupings are paying increased attention to the treaties relating to weapons of mass 
destruction, so we recommend that it be included as the third paragraph of the Article XIV 
section of the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference: 
 
3.   The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to 
wider accession to the Convention.  
 
72.  Likewise there is no advantage -- and indeed, there are clear disadvantages -- from 
omitting the first sentence of the fifth paragraph which, however, needs to be corrected as 
pointed out29 in the Key Points by the insertion of "not" prior to "taken place" in the second 
line.  This error appeared for the first time in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review 
Conference and appears to have been inadvertent.  We recommend that the first sentence be 
included as the fourth paragraph of the Article XIV section of the Final Declaration of the 
Fifth Review Conference with amendments from the 1996 Final Declaration shown in bold: 
 
4. The Fifth Review Conference appeals to those States Parties to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention which have not taken part in the Conference to 
participate in the implementation of provisions contained in the Final Declaration of 
this Conference.  
 
Article XV 
 
73.  The draft Article XV section consists of one paragraph which is agreed. This is the same 
number as in the Article XV section of the 1996 Final Declaration.  The draft Article XV 
section states that: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of this Article as well as the legal status of the 
languages of the Convention and the United Nations system, including the Arabic 
language, which is an official language of the United Nations system, in the conduct 
of business related to the Convention. 
 
74.  This paragraph is developed from that of the Article XV section of the 1996 Final 
Declaration which stated that: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of this Article as well as the importance of the 
legal status of the languages of the Convention and United Nations system in the work 
of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in 1994.   
 
The clause "in the work of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in 1994" 
has been replaced by "in the conduct of business related to the Convention" and the additional 
clause "including the Arabic language, which is an official language of the United Nations 
                                                 
29See page 134, paragraph 4 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), 
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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system," has been added.  We recommend that the draft Article XV section be adopted as 
drafted. 
 
 
 
Consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference 
in 1994 
 
75.  No language was included in the draft Final Declaration which simply recorded that 
(Language awaited from Facilitator on Follow-Up/AHG (President).)  In Key Points we 
proposed30 language which was drafted to be non-controversial and thereby would attract, we 
hoped, the support of all States Parties.  The language proposed was as follows: 
 
The Conference notes the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group since the Fourth 
Review Conference and notes in particular the following:  
 
- The Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (September 1994) 
agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group open to all States Parties to consider 
appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft 
proposals to strengthen the Convention. 
 
- Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Group has held one short organizational 
session and twenty-three substantive sessions. 
 
- In accordance with its mandate, as contained in the Final Report of the 
Special Conference (BWC/SPCONF/1), the Ad Hoc Group has been 
considering appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, 
to strengthen the Convention. Where relevant, consideration of issues has 
sought to build on the considerable body of technical work connected with 
strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime 
undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of Technical Experts to Identify and 
Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical 
Standpoint (VEREX) in 1992 and 1993. 
 
- The Ad Hoc Group has made progress towards fulfilling the mandate given 
by the Special Conference. 
 
- Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Group was not able to complete its work and 
submit its report including a draft of the future legally-binding instrument to 
the States Parties for consideration at the Fifth Review Conference.  
 
The Conference encourages the Ad Hoc Group to continue its work in order to fulfil 
its mandate. 
 
                                                 
30See pages 146 to 151, paragraphs 2 to 13 of Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims 
(eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc 
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76.   Given the attempt by the United States in its proposed language on 7 December 2001 to 
terminate the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, it is evident that it is likely to be even more 
difficult at the resumption of the Review Conference in November 2002 to find language that 
is acceptable to the United States and also to the other States Parties.  In these circumstances, 
we recommend that language be considered which is purely factual about the work of the Ad 
Hoc Group, using largely language agreed in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review 
Conference, and says nothing about further work, along the following lines: 
 
The Conference notes the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group since the Fourth 
Review Conference and notes in particular the following:  
 
- The Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (September 1994) 
agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group open to all States Parties to consider 
appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft 
proposals to strengthen the Convention. 
 
- Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Group has held one short organizational 
session and twenty-three substantive sessions. 
 
- In accordance with its mandate, as contained in the Final Report of the 
Special Conference (BWC/SPCONF/1), the Ad Hoc Group has been 
considering appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, 
to strengthen the Convention. Where relevant, consideration of issues has 
sought to build on the considerable body of technical work connected with 
strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime 
undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of Technical Experts to Identify and 
Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical 
Standpoint (VEREX) in 1992 and 1993. 
 
- The Ad Hoc Group has made progress towards fulfilling the mandate given 
by the Special Conference. 
 
- Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Group was not able to complete its work and 
submit its report including a draft of the future legally-binding instrument to 
the States Parties for consideration at the Fifth Review Conference.  
 
Conclusions 
 
77.  The resumed Fifth Review Conference in November 2002 is taking place after a year in 
which States Parties have had ample opportunity to prepare for the resumption -- as was 
pointed out in April 2002 in Review Conference Paper No. 531 which noted that: 
 
Delegates will have no excuse after this 11 months' interval for not having mastered 
their brief, including the wealth of constructive ideas and textual proposals offered by 
NGOs and other friends of the Convention.  This resumed session should be the most 
                                                 
31Nicholas A. Sims, Return to Geneva:  The Next Stage of the BTWC Fifth Review Conference, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 5, April 2002.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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thoroughly prepared and the best informed occasion in the whole history of the 
BTWC review process. 
 
It has been clear from the developments prior to the start of the Fifth Review Conference and 
during the year since the adjournment on 7 December 2001 that there is immense national 
and international concern about biological weapons -- whether from biological terrorism or 
from biological weapons in the hands of States.  This concern is further underlined by the 
burgeoning developments in the life sciences in areas such as biotechnology, genomics and 
molecular biology and the possibility that such advances might be misused for purposes 
prohibited under the Convention.  It is thus vital that all States Parties need to consider what 
to do to make, and to be seen to have made, the world a safer place for all of us.  The need to 
adjourn the Fifth Review Conference on 7 December 2001, when the United States 
introduced an unacceptable proposal two hours prior to the planned end of the Fifth Review 
Conference, was understandable.   A further such suspension in November 2002 would be 
inexcusable particularly given the time that States Parties have had to consider all the 
possible outcomes and the options to deal with them. 
 
78.  It is critically important for the Review Conference to be seen to have strengthened the 
regime totally prohibiting biological weapons through the reaffirmations and the continued 
and further extension of the understandings developed at previous Review Conferences.  It is 
simply not the time for a failure to adopt a Final Declaration -- and one which embodies a 
follow-up programme to further nurture and sustain the Convention.   States Parties should 
therefore be ready to use voting32, if need be, to overcome continued intransigence.  There is 
a compelling need now to establish the groundwork for concrete legally binding measures 
that would help to strengthen the regime.   States Parties need to consider what message a 
failure to adopt a Final Declaration would send to the international community -- that the 
States Parties simply do not care enough about the international legal norm represented by the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to rescue the regime from a short sighted 
ideological prejudice that appears to disregard the value of the international norm.  Failure 
would also send a totally wrong message about the seriousness with which the States Parties 
now regard the threat of biological and toxin weapons. 
 
79.  States Parties are therefore urged to avoid falling into acrimony and to go the extra mile 
to find and adopt a Final Declaration that sends the message that the international community 
is indeed determined to strengthen the treaty regime and so do all that is possible to counter 
the risks of biological terrorism or of biological weapons being retained or developed by 
States.  It is time for the States Parties -- and especially the co-Depositaries -- to demonstrate 
their commitment to the Convention and the continued development of the regime in the light 
of the challenges of today and tomorrow.  
 
 
                                                 
32Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Return to Geneva:  Uncertainties and Options,  University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 8, October 2002.  Available at 
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CHECK LIST  
 
 CHANGES RECOMMENDED TO THE DRAFT FINAL DECLARATION  
ISSUED ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY 7 DECEMBER 2001 
 
Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
Solemn 
Declaration 
Heading Update to read " ... WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 19 
NOVEMBER TO 7 DECEMBER 2001 AND FROM 11 TO 
22 NOVEMBER 2002 TO REVIEW..." 
 Third 
subpara 
Correct typographical error in the second line to read 
"(Biological)". 
 New 
subpara 
Add - Their reaffirmation that purposes of this Convention 
include the prohibition of the use of biological weapons as 
contrary to the purpose of the Convention. 
Preamble  No changes. 
Article I 3 3.  The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States 
Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, including 
within their own territory, of microbial or other biological 
agents or toxins, as well as of weapons, equipment or means 
of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict, that is not consistent with 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is 
effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention. 
[Underlining indicates new language from that agreed at the 
Fourth Review Conference] 
 5 5. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention 
unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological agents 
or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well 
as their components, whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  Consequently, prions, proteins and bioregulators 
and their synthetically produced analogues and 
components are covered. 
 6 6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from 
relevant scientific and technological developments, inter alia, 
in the life sciences in animals and plants as well as in 
humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the 
Convention, reaffirms that the undertakings given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such  developments. 
Consequently, genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics are 
covered.  
 7 7.  The Conference notes that experimentation involving 
open-air release of pathogens or toxins harmful to animals 
or plants that has no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the 
undertakings contained in Article I. 
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Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
 10. 10. The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital 
importance of full implementation by all States Parties of all 
the provisions of the Convention, especially Article I. The 
Conference calls upon all States Parties and Signatories to 
comply fully with their obligations on the basis of the 
conviction that any non-compliance with its provisions could 
undermine confidence in, and achieving the basic provisions 
of, the Convention. Non-compliance should be treated with 
determination in all cases, without selectivity or 
discrimination. [Underlining indicates new language from 
that agreed at the Fourth Review Conference] 
Article II 1 1. The Conference recognizes that for any State acceding to 
the Convention after the entry into force of the Convention, 
the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes specified in 
Article II would be completed upon accession to the 
Convention. The Conference emphasizes that the destruction 
or diversion to peaceful purposes specified in Article II 
should be carried out completely and effectively and affirms 
that any past biological weapons facilities should likewise 
be destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes.  
 New para 3. The Conference notes that the submission to the 
Department for Disarmament Affairs of appropriate 
information on destruction by States Parties which had 
stockpiles and have destroyed them in fulfilment of their 
Article II obligations, and of appropriate information on 
destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of any past 
biological weapons facilities, when sufficiently specific as 
to types, quantities, location and the date and method of the 
destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes, may enhance 
confidence in the Convention and its objectives, and calls on 
States Parties which had stockpiles or facilities and which 
have not already made such submissions to make them 
without delay.  
Article III 8 8. The Conference encourages States Parties to consider, 
within the framework of the Convention, ways to enhance 
the implementation of this Article, including elaboration of 
a set of common principles and guidelines in the field of 
export controls. 
 9 9.  The Conference takes note with interest of the provisions 
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which addresses, 
inter alia, transboundary movements of living genetically 
modified organisms. 
Article IV 3 In second line replace "for example" by "including". 
 4 The word "promptly." should be agreed and the word "dual-
use" deleted. 
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Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
 5 In the third line of the third subparagraph, correct the 
typographical error so as to read  "Weapons". 
 8 The word "regime" should be agreed. 
 13 13. The Conference invites States Parties to consider, as 
appropriate, the negotiation of legal agreements to prevent 
and eliminate crimes involving biological and toxin 
weapons. 
 14 This paragraph should be deleted. 
Article V 1 In the second sentence the words "and reiterated at the 
Fourth Review Confernce" should be inserted after "The 
Conference reiterates its appeal to States Parties made at the 
Third Review Conference" 
 2 The second and third sentences should read "The Conference 
notes that the implementation provisions were invoked since 
the Fourth Review Conference and reaffirms their 
continuing validity.  The Conference calls upon ... "  
 3 This paragraph should be agreed. 
 7 The typographical error in the fourth line should be corrected 
so as to read "States Parties" 
 8 This should be extended to read "... national implementation 
of the CBMs and to advise the United Nations of the name 
and address of the national entity." 
 9 This should be amended to read:  
9.  The Conference takes note of proposals to expand the 
scope of existing confidence building measures, to improve 
existing measures and to create new measures, in order to 
provide a broader range of relevant information, consistent 
with the approach agreed upon in 1991 and decides to hold 
an ad hoc meeting of the States Parties to finalise the 
modalities for these measures by working out, inter alia, 
appropriate forms to be used by the States Parties.  The 
group shall meet in Geneva for the period [31 March - 11 
April 2003] and shall communicate the results of the work 
to the States Parties immediately thereafter.  
Article VI 4 This should be amended to read:   
4. The Conference invites States Parties when considering 
the development of a legally-binding instrument to 
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention to include a compliance 
mechanism to conduct investigations regarding alleged 
breaches of the Convention. 
 5 The phrase at the start of the final sentence "Pending the 
establishment of the mechanism described in the paragraph 
above," should be agreed. 
Article VII  No changes. 
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Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
Article VIII 3 The typographical error in the fifth line should be corrected  
to read "Poisonous". 
 4 The typographical errors in the fourth line should be 
corrected to read "Parties" and in the sixth and seventh lines  
to read "States Parties". 
 6 The typographical error in the third line should be corrected  
to read "Convention". 
 6 Extended by the following additional sentence: "The 
Conference authorises its [Committee of Oversight] to 
follow up this request from the Conference by undertaking 
demarches as appropriate to those States Parties that 
continue to maintain pertinent reservations."  
Article IX 3 This paragraph should be agreed. 
Article X 5 The words 5 bis  The Conference underlines the importance, 
in the context of Article X implementation,  of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and of the Rio Declaration and the 
Agenda 21 adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, 1992.  The Conference welcomes the adoption of the 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity in 2001 and looks forward to further steps being 
taken during the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
to be held in Johannesburg, in 2002. should be agreed 
updated as appropriate to take into account the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development held in South Africa 
earlier this year. 
 6 The clause "or limitations on the transfer," in subparagraph c 
should be agreed.  
 8 The typographical error in the first line should be corrected  
to read "Fourth". 
 12 The typographical error in the last line should be corrected  to 
read "bacteriological". 
 13 The missing words "efforts to" should be inserted in the first 
line after "The Conference" thereby making the language 
identical to that in the 1996 Final Declaration. 
 16 The typographical errors in the second line should be 
corrected  to read "Laboratory Practice". 
 20 This should be amended to read:  20.  The Conference calls 
for the establishment of a forum for consultation and 
creation of opportunities for cooperation on matters related 
to the promotion of scientific and technological exchange in 
the field of peaceful, bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
activities, and review of the implementation of Article X of 
the Convention as a subsidiary organ to the Oversight 
Committee established under Article XII. 
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Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
Article XI  No changes. 
Article XII 3 This should be amended to read:  "3.  The Review Conference 
decides that conferences of States Parties to review the 
operation of the Convention should be held at least every five 
years."  
 2 The first and second subparagraphs should be updated and 
agreed as:  
- The impact of scientific and technological developments 
relating to the Convention; 
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the effective 
implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, duly taking into account the degree of 
universality attained by such conventions at the time of the 
Sixth Review Conference; 
 2 The third subparagraph should be extended to read:  
- The effectiveness of confidence-building measures as 
agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences and at 
the ad-hoc meeting following this Review Conference; 
 2 The fourth subparagraph should be amended to read; 
-  The conclusions of a Special Conference, if held before the 
Sixth Review Conference for the purpose of receiving a 
report, including a legally-binding instrument to strengthen 
the Convention.  The inclusion of this agenda item is without 
prejudice to the positions of States Parties on  matters under 
negotiation; 
 2 The fifth subparagraph should be extended to read: 
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested 
allocation by the United Nations Secretary-General of staff 
resources and other requirements to assist the effective 
implementation of the relevant decisions of this and previous 
Review Conferences; 
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Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
 New paras The Article XII section should be extended to make provision 
at least for: 
- prolongation to 2006 of the General Committee of the Fifth 
Review Conference, or a smaller committee elected from its 
membership, constituted as a continuing representative body 
or bureau; 
- authorisation for this continuing representative body or 
bureau to establish, as it finds necessary, subsidiary organs 
such as a Scientific Advisory Panel, a Legal Advisory Panel 
and in relation to Article X a Cooperation Advisory Panel; 
- establishment, in consultation with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, of a small secretariat dedicated 
exclusively to the service of the Convention; 
- financing of these mechanisms, and of any follow-up 
meetings of States Parties as an appendix of the Fifth Review 
Conference; 
together with such annual meetings of States Parties and ad 
hoc meetings as also may be agreed. 
These provisions should be included in further paragraphs 
drawing as appropriate on the detailed mandate 
recommended in Key Points and reproduced in paragraph 62 
of RCP # 9. 
Article XIII 1 This should be extended to read: The Conference notes the 
provisions of Article XIII and, while emphasizing that the 
Convention is of unlimited duration and applies at all times, 
expresses its satisfaction that no State Party to the 
Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the 
Convention. 
Article XIV 1 This should be amended to read: 1. The Conference notes 
with satisfaction that nine States have ratified or acceded to 
the Convention since the Fourth Review Conference. 
 2 This paragraph should be extended to read: 2. The 
Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or 
acceded to the Convention to do so without delay and upon 
those States which have not signed the Convention to join 
the States Parties thereto, thus contributing to the 
achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.  In 
this connection, the Conference requests States Parties to 
encourage universality of the Convention. 
 New para An additional paragraph should be agreed as follows: 3.   The 
Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that 
would lead to wider accession to the Convention.   
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Draft Final 
Declaration 
Paragraph Recommended change 
 New para An additional paragraph should be agreed as follows: 4. The 
Fifth Review Conference appeals to those States Parties to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which have 
not taken part in the Conference to participate in the 
implementation of provisions contained in the Final 
Declaration of this Conference.  
Article XV  No changes 
Consideration 
of the work of 
the Ad Hoc 
Group ... 
New paras Additional paragraphs should be agreed as follows: 
The Conference notes the work carried out by the Ad Hoc 
Group since the Fourth Review Conference and notes in 
particular the following:  
- The Special Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention on the prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (September 
1994) agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group open to all 
States Parties to consider appropriate measures, including 
possible verification measures, and draft proposals to 
strengthen the Convention. 
- Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Group has held one 
short organizational session and twenty-three substantive 
sessions. 
- In accordance with its mandate, as contained in the Final 
Report of the Special Conference (BWC/SPCONF/1), the Ad 
Hoc Group has been considering appropriate measures, 
including possible verification measures, to strengthen the 
Convention. Where relevant, consideration of issues has 
sought to build on the considerable body of technical work 
connected with strengthening the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention regime undertaken by the Ad Hoc 
Group of Technical Experts to Identify and Examine 
Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and 
Technical Standpoint (VEREX) in 1992 and 1993. 
- The Ad Hoc Group has made progress towards fulfilling the 
mandate given by the Special Conference. 
- Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Group was not able to complete 
its work and submit its report including a draft of the future 
legally-binding instrument to the States Parties for 
consideration at the Fifth Review Conference.  
 
